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package org.bouncycastle.tls;
/**
* RFC 5246 7.2.
*/
public class AlertDescription
{
/**
* This message notifies the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages on this
* connection. Note that as of TLS 1.1, failure to properly close a connection no longer
* requires that a session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 ("The session becomes
* unresumable if any connection is terminated without proper close_notify messages with level
* equal to warning.") to conform with widespread implementation practice.
*/
public static final short close_notify = 0;
/**
* An inappropriate message was received. This alert is always fatal and should never be
* observed in communication between proper implementations.
*/
public static final short unexpected_message = 10;
/**
* This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect MAC. This alert also MUST be
* returned if an alert is sent because a TLSCiphertext decrypted in an invalid way: either it
* wasn't an even multiple of the block length, or its padding values, when checked, weren't
* correct. This message is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between
* proper implementations (except when messages were corrupted in the network).
*/
public static final short bad_record_mac = 20;
/**
* This alert was used in some earlier versions of TLS, and may have permitted certain attacks
* against the CBC mode [CBCATT]. It MUST NOT be sent by compliant implementations.
*/
public static final short decryption_failed = 21;
/**
* A TLSCiphertext record was received that had a length more than 2^14+2048 bytes, or a record
* decrypted to a TLSCompressed record with more than 2^14+1024 bytes. This message is always
* fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper implementations (except
* when messages were corrupted in the network).
*/
public static final short record_overflow = 22;
/**
* The decompression function received improper input (e.g., data that would expand to excessive
* length). This message is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between
* proper implementations.
*/
public static final short decompression_failure = 30;
/**
* Reception of a handshake_failure alert message indicates that the sender was unable to
* negotiate an acceptable set of security parameters given the options available. This is a
* fatal error.
*/
public static final short handshake_failure = 40;
/**
* This alert was used in SSLv3 but not any version of TLS. It MUST NOT be sent by compliant
* implementations.
*/
public static final short no_certificate = 41;
/**
* A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not verify correctly, etc.
*/
public static final short bad_certificate = 42;
/**
* A certificate was of an unsupported type.
*/
public static final short unsupported_certificate = 43;
/**
* A certificate was revoked by its signer.
*/
public static final short certificate_revoked = 44;
/**
* A certificate has expired or is not currently valid.
*/
public static final short certificate_expired = 45;
/**
* Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the certificate, rendering it
* unacceptable.
*/
public static final short certificate_unknown = 46;
/**
* A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent with other fields. This message is
* always fatal.
*/
public static final short illegal_parameter = 47;
/**
* A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted
* because the CA certificate could not be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted
* CA. This message is always fatal.
*/
public static final short unknown_ca = 48;
/**
* A valid certificate was received, but when access control was applied, the sender decided not
* to proceed with negotiation. This message is always fatal.
*/
public static final short access_denied = 49;
/**
* A message could not be decoded because some field was out of the specified range or the
* length of the message was incorrect. This message is always fatal and should never be
* observed in communication between proper implementations (except when messages were corrupted
* in the network).
*/
public static final short decode_error = 50;
/**
* A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being unable to correctly verify a
* signature or validate a Finished message. This message is always fatal.
*/
public static final short decrypt_error = 51;
/**
* This alert was used in some earlier versions of TLS. It MUST NOT be sent by compliant
* implementations.
*/
public static final short export_restriction = 60;
/**
* The protocol version the client has attempted to negotiate is recognized but not supported.
* (For example, old protocol versions might be avoided for security reasons.) This message is
* always fatal.
*/
public static final short protocol_version = 70;
/**
* Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has failed specifically because the
* server requires ciphers more secure than those supported by the client. This message is
* always fatal.
*/
public static final short insufficient_security = 71;
/**
* An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the protocol (such as a memory
* allocation failure) makes it impossible to continue. This message is always fatal.
*/
public static final short internal_error = 80;
/**
* This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated to a protocol failure. If the user
* cancels an operation after the handshake is complete, just closing the connection by sending
* a close_notify is more appropriate. This alert should be followed by a close_notify. This
* message is generally a warning.
*/
public static final short user_canceled = 90;
/**
* Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the server in response to a client
* hello after initial handshaking. Either of these would normally lead to renegotiation; when
* that is not appropriate, the recipient should respond with this alert. At that point, the
* original requester can decide whether to proceed with the connection. One case where this
* would be appropriate is where a server has spawned a process to satisfy a request; the
* process might receive security parameters (key length, authentication, etc.) at startup, and
* it might be difficult to communicate changes to these parameters after that point. This
* message is always a warning.
*/
public static final short no_renegotiation = 100;
/**
* Sent by clients that receive an extended server hello containing an extension that they did
* not put in the corresponding client hello. This message is always fatal.
*/
public static final short unsupported_extension = 110;
/*
* RFC 3546
*/
/**
* This alert is sent by servers who are unable to retrieve a certificate chain from the URL
* supplied by the client (see Section 3.3). This message MAY be fatal - for example if client
* authentication is required by the server for the handshake to continue and the server is
* unable to retrieve the certificate chain, it may send a fatal alert.
*/
public static final short certificate_unobtainable = 111;
/**
* This alert is sent by servers that receive a server_name extension request, but do not
* recognize the server name. This message MAY be fatal.
*/
public static final short unrecognized_name = 112;
/**
* This alert is sent by clients that receive an invalid certificate status response (see
* Section 3.6). This message is always fatal.
*/
public static final short bad_certificate_status_response = 113;
/**
* This alert is sent by servers when a certificate hash does not match a client provided
* certificate_hash. This message is always fatal.
*/
public static final short bad_certificate_hash_value = 114;
/*
* RFC 4279
*/
/**
* If the server does not recognize the PSK identity, it MAY respond with an
* "unknown_psk_identity" alert message.
*/
public static final short unknown_psk_identity = 115;
/*
* RFC 7301
*/
/**
* In the event that the server supports no protocols that the client advertises, then the
* server SHALL respond with a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert.
*/
public static final short no_application_protocol = 120;
/*
* RFC 7507
*/
/**
* If TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV appears in ClientHello.cipher_suites and the highest protocol version
* supported by the server is higher than the version indicated in ClientHello.client_version,
* the server MUST respond with a fatal inappropriate_fallback alert [..].
*/
public static final short inappropriate_fallback = 86;
/*
* RFC 8446
*/
/**
* Sent by endpoints that receive a handshake message not containing an extension that is
* mandatory to send for the offered TLS version or other negotiated parameters.
*/
public static final short missing_extension = 109;
/**
* Sent by servers when a client certificate is desired but none was provided by the client.
*/
public static final short certificate_required = 116;
public static String getName(short alertDescription)
{
switch (alertDescription)
{
case close_notify:
return "close_notify";
case unexpected_message:
return "unexpected_message";
case bad_record_mac:
return "bad_record_mac";
case decryption_failed:
return "decryption_failed";
case record_overflow:
return "record_overflow";
case decompression_failure:
return "decompression_failure";
case handshake_failure:
return "handshake_failure";
case no_certificate:
return "no_certificate";
case bad_certificate:
return "bad_certificate";
case unsupported_certificate:
return "unsupported_certificate";
case certificate_revoked:
return "certificate_revoked";
case certificate_expired:
return "certificate_expired";
case certificate_unknown:
return "certificate_unknown";
case illegal_parameter:
return "illegal_parameter";
case unknown_ca:
return "unknown_ca";
case access_denied:
return "access_denied";
case decode_error:
return "decode_error";
case decrypt_error:
return "decrypt_error";
case export_restriction:
return "export_restriction";
case protocol_version:
return "protocol_version";
case insufficient_security:
return "insufficient_security";
case internal_error:
return "internal_error";
case user_canceled:
return "user_canceled";
case no_renegotiation:
return "no_renegotiation";
case unsupported_extension:
return "unsupported_extension";
case certificate_unobtainable:
return "certificate_unobtainable";
case unrecognized_name:
return "unrecognized_name";
case bad_certificate_status_response:
return "bad_certificate_status_response";
case bad_certificate_hash_value:
return "bad_certificate_hash_value";
case unknown_psk_identity:
return "unknown_psk_identity";
case no_application_protocol:
return "no_application_protocol";
case inappropriate_fallback:
return "inappropriate_fallback";
case missing_extension:
return "missing_extension";
case certificate_required:
return "certificate_required";
default:
return "UNKNOWN";
}
}
public static String getText(short alertDescription)
{
return getName(alertDescription) + "(" + alertDescription + ")";
}
}