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/*
 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not use this file except
 * in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
 *
 * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 *
 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License
 * is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express
 * or implied. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations under
 * the License.
 */
/*
 * This code was generated by https://github.com/googleapis/google-api-java-client-services/
 * Modify at your own risk.
 */

package com.google.api.services.containeranalysis.v1.model;

/**
 * Verifiers (e.g. Kritis implementations) MUST verify signatures with respect to the trust anchors
 * defined in policy (e.g. a Kritis policy). Typically this means that the verifier has been
 * configured with a map from `public_key_id` to public key material (and any required parameters,
 * e.g. signing algorithm). In particular, verification implementations MUST NOT treat the signature
 * `public_key_id` as anything more than a key lookup hint. The `public_key_id` DOES NOT validate or
 * authenticate a public key; it only provides a mechanism for quickly selecting a public key
 * ALREADY CONFIGURED on the verifier through a trusted channel. Verification implementations MUST
 * reject signatures in any of the following circumstances: * The `public_key_id` is not recognized
 * by the verifier. * The public key that `public_key_id` refers to does not verify the signature
 * with respect to the payload. The `signature` contents SHOULD NOT be "attached" (where the payload
 * is included with the serialized `signature` bytes). Verifiers MUST ignore any "attached" payload
 * and only verify signatures with respect to explicitly provided payload (e.g. a `payload` field on
 * the proto message that holds this Signature, or the canonical serialization of the proto message
 * that holds this signature).
 *
 * 

This is the Java data model class that specifies how to parse/serialize into the JSON that is * transmitted over HTTP when working with the Container Analysis API. For a detailed explanation * see: * https://developers.google.com/api-client-library/java/google-http-java-client/json *

* * @author Google, Inc. */ @SuppressWarnings("javadoc") public final class Signature extends com.google.api.client.json.GenericJson { /** * The identifier for the public key that verifies this signature. * The `public_key_id` is * required. * The `public_key_id` SHOULD be an RFC3986 conformant URI. * When possible, the * `public_key_id` SHOULD be an immutable reference, such as a cryptographic digest. Examples of * valid `public_key_id`s: OpenPGP V4 public key fingerprint: * * "openpgp4fpr:74FAF3B861BDA0870C7B6DEF607E48D2A663AEEA" See * https://www.iana.org/assignments/uri-schemes/prov/openpgp4fpr for more details on this scheme. * RFC6920 digest-named SubjectPublicKeyInfo (digest of the DER serialization): * * "ni:sha-256;cD9o9Cq6LG3jD0iKXqEi_vdjJGecm_iXkbqVoScViaU" * * "nih:sha-256;703f68f42aba2c6de30f488a5ea122fef76324679c9bf89791ba95a1271589a5" * The value may be {@code null}. */ @com.google.api.client.util.Key private java.lang.String publicKeyId; /** * The content of the signature, an opaque bytestring. The payload that this signature verifies * MUST be unambiguously provided with the Signature during verification. A wrapper message might * provide the payload explicitly. Alternatively, a message might have a canonical serialization * that can always be unambiguously computed to derive the payload. * The value may be {@code null}. */ @com.google.api.client.util.Key private java.lang.String signature; /** * The identifier for the public key that verifies this signature. * The `public_key_id` is * required. * The `public_key_id` SHOULD be an RFC3986 conformant URI. * When possible, the * `public_key_id` SHOULD be an immutable reference, such as a cryptographic digest. Examples of * valid `public_key_id`s: OpenPGP V4 public key fingerprint: * * "openpgp4fpr:74FAF3B861BDA0870C7B6DEF607E48D2A663AEEA" See * https://www.iana.org/assignments/uri-schemes/prov/openpgp4fpr for more details on this scheme. * RFC6920 digest-named SubjectPublicKeyInfo (digest of the DER serialization): * * "ni:sha-256;cD9o9Cq6LG3jD0iKXqEi_vdjJGecm_iXkbqVoScViaU" * * "nih:sha-256;703f68f42aba2c6de30f488a5ea122fef76324679c9bf89791ba95a1271589a5" * @return value or {@code null} for none */ public java.lang.String getPublicKeyId() { return publicKeyId; } /** * The identifier for the public key that verifies this signature. * The `public_key_id` is * required. * The `public_key_id` SHOULD be an RFC3986 conformant URI. * When possible, the * `public_key_id` SHOULD be an immutable reference, such as a cryptographic digest. Examples of * valid `public_key_id`s: OpenPGP V4 public key fingerprint: * * "openpgp4fpr:74FAF3B861BDA0870C7B6DEF607E48D2A663AEEA" See * https://www.iana.org/assignments/uri-schemes/prov/openpgp4fpr for more details on this scheme. * RFC6920 digest-named SubjectPublicKeyInfo (digest of the DER serialization): * * "ni:sha-256;cD9o9Cq6LG3jD0iKXqEi_vdjJGecm_iXkbqVoScViaU" * * "nih:sha-256;703f68f42aba2c6de30f488a5ea122fef76324679c9bf89791ba95a1271589a5" * @param publicKeyId publicKeyId or {@code null} for none */ public Signature setPublicKeyId(java.lang.String publicKeyId) { this.publicKeyId = publicKeyId; return this; } /** * The content of the signature, an opaque bytestring. The payload that this signature verifies * MUST be unambiguously provided with the Signature during verification. A wrapper message might * provide the payload explicitly. Alternatively, a message might have a canonical serialization * that can always be unambiguously computed to derive the payload. * @see #decodeSignature() * @return value or {@code null} for none */ public java.lang.String getSignature() { return signature; } /** * The content of the signature, an opaque bytestring. The payload that this signature verifies * MUST be unambiguously provided with the Signature during verification. A wrapper message might * provide the payload explicitly. Alternatively, a message might have a canonical serialization * that can always be unambiguously computed to derive the payload. * @see #getSignature() * @return Base64 decoded value or {@code null} for none * * @since 1.14 */ public byte[] decodeSignature() { return com.google.api.client.util.Base64.decodeBase64(signature); } /** * The content of the signature, an opaque bytestring. The payload that this signature verifies * MUST be unambiguously provided with the Signature during verification. A wrapper message might * provide the payload explicitly. Alternatively, a message might have a canonical serialization * that can always be unambiguously computed to derive the payload. * @see #encodeSignature() * @param signature signature or {@code null} for none */ public Signature setSignature(java.lang.String signature) { this.signature = signature; return this; } /** * The content of the signature, an opaque bytestring. The payload that this signature verifies * MUST be unambiguously provided with the Signature during verification. A wrapper message might * provide the payload explicitly. Alternatively, a message might have a canonical serialization * that can always be unambiguously computed to derive the payload. * @see #setSignature() * *

* The value is encoded Base64 or {@code null} for none. *

* * @since 1.14 */ public Signature encodeSignature(byte[] signature) { this.signature = com.google.api.client.util.Base64.encodeBase64URLSafeString(signature); return this; } @Override public Signature set(String fieldName, Object value) { return (Signature) super.set(fieldName, value); } @Override public Signature clone() { return (Signature) super.clone(); } }




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