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Tink is a small cryptographic library that provides a safe, simple, agile and fast way to accomplish some common cryptographic tasks.
// Copyright 2022 Google LLC
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
package com.google.crypto.tink.mac.internal;
import static java.lang.Math.min;
import com.google.crypto.tink.AccessesPartialKey;
import com.google.crypto.tink.InsecureSecretKeyAccess;
import com.google.crypto.tink.mac.AesCmacKey;
import com.google.crypto.tink.mac.AesCmacParameters.Variant;
import com.google.crypto.tink.mac.ChunkedMacComputation;
import com.google.crypto.tink.subtle.Bytes;
import com.google.crypto.tink.subtle.EngineFactory;
import java.nio.ByteBuffer;
import java.security.GeneralSecurityException;
import java.util.Arrays;
import javax.crypto.Cipher;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
/**
* An implementation of streaming CMAC computation following
* tink/java_src/src/main/java/com/google/crypto/tink/subtle/PrfAesCmac.java's vision of RFC 4493.
*/
@AccessesPartialKey
final class ChunkedAesCmacComputation implements ChunkedMacComputation {
// A single byte to be added to the plaintext for the legacy key type.
private static final byte[] FORMAT_VERSION = new byte[] {0};
private final Cipher aes;
private final AesCmacKey key;
// subKey1 and subKey2 are derived as in RFC 4493.
private final byte[] subKey1;
private final byte[] subKey2;
/**
* We need this AES-block sized buffer in order to account for the possibility of data not
* arriving in perfect blocks, and also because we never know which block is going to be the last,
* so we need to cache some data unprocessed between calls to update().
*
* Invariant: between calls we have: 0 <= localStash.position < 16, and localStash is a suffix of
* data so far, such that the rest is divisible by 16.
*/
private final ByteBuffer localStash;
/* x and y contain the contents as in RFC 4493. */
private final ByteBuffer x;
private final ByteBuffer y;
private boolean finalized = false;
ChunkedAesCmacComputation(AesCmacKey key) throws GeneralSecurityException {
this.key = key;
aes = EngineFactory.CIPHER.getInstance("AES/ECB/NoPadding");
aes.init(
Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE,
new SecretKeySpec(this.key.getAesKey().toByteArray(InsecureSecretKeyAccess.get()), "AES"));
// Generate subkeys; https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4493#section-2.3
byte[] zeroes = new byte[AesUtil.BLOCK_SIZE];
// As per documentation, the cipher is good to use after doFinal():
// https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/javax/crypto/Cipher.html#doFinal(byte[])
byte[] l = aes.doFinal(zeroes);
subKey1 = AesUtil.dbl(l);
subKey2 = AesUtil.dbl(subKey1);
localStash = ByteBuffer.allocate(AesUtil.BLOCK_SIZE);
x = ByteBuffer.allocate(AesUtil.BLOCK_SIZE);
y = ByteBuffer.allocate(AesUtil.BLOCK_SIZE);
}
private void munch(ByteBuffer data) throws GeneralSecurityException {
y.rewind();
x.rewind();
Bytes.xor(/* output= */ y, /* x= */ x, /* y= */ data, AesUtil.BLOCK_SIZE);
y.rewind();
x.rewind();
aes.doFinal(/* input= */ y, /* output= */ x);
}
@Override
public void update(ByteBuffer data) throws GeneralSecurityException {
if (finalized) {
throw new IllegalStateException(
"Can not update after computing the MAC tag. Please create a new object.");
}
if (localStash.remaining() != AesUtil.BLOCK_SIZE) {
// Only copy data into the stash if there are existing leftovers.
int bytesToCopy = min(localStash.remaining(), data.remaining());
for (int i = 0; i < bytesToCopy; i++) {
localStash.put(data.get());
}
}
if (localStash.remaining() == 0 && data.remaining() > 0) {
// Stash is full but there is more data.
localStash.rewind();
munch(localStash);
localStash.rewind();
}
// Now, "stash is empty" OR "data is empty".
// Now process directly from the rest of the input buffer.
// NOTE: if there are exactly block_size bytes left, don't process yet. (may be last block)
while (data.remaining() > AesUtil.BLOCK_SIZE) {
munch(data);
}
// There is now {0 .. block size} data left,
// stash is empty with the block size capacity
// => we can safely stuff everything into stash.
localStash.put(data);
}
@Override
public byte[] computeMac() throws GeneralSecurityException {
if (finalized) {
throw new IllegalStateException(
"Can not compute after computing the MAC tag. Please create a new object.");
}
if (key.getParameters().getVariant() == Variant.LEGACY) {
update(ByteBuffer.wrap(FORMAT_VERSION));
}
finalized = true;
byte[] mLast;
if (localStash.remaining() > 0) {
// An incomplete block or an empty input.
byte[] lastChunkToPad = Arrays.copyOf(localStash.array(), localStash.position());
mLast = Bytes.xor(AesUtil.cmacPad(lastChunkToPad), subKey2);
} else {
// Block is full (remaining() == 0).
mLast = Bytes.xor(localStash.array(), 0, subKey1, 0, AesUtil.BLOCK_SIZE);
}
return Bytes.concat(
key.getOutputPrefix().toByteArray(),
Arrays.copyOf(
aes.doFinal(Bytes.xor(mLast, x.array())),
key.getParameters().getCryptographicTagSizeBytes()));
}
}
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