
com.google.crypto.tink.subtle.AesEaxJce Maven / Gradle / Ivy
Show all versions of tink-android Show documentation
// Copyright 2017 Google Inc.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
package com.google.crypto.tink.subtle;
import static com.google.crypto.tink.internal.Util.isPrefix;
import com.google.crypto.tink.AccessesPartialKey;
import com.google.crypto.tink.Aead;
import com.google.crypto.tink.InsecureSecretKeyAccess;
import com.google.crypto.tink.aead.AesEaxKey;
import com.google.crypto.tink.config.internal.TinkFipsUtil;
import java.security.GeneralSecurityException;
import java.util.Arrays;
import javax.crypto.AEADBadTagException;
import javax.crypto.BadPaddingException;
import javax.crypto.Cipher;
import javax.crypto.IllegalBlockSizeException;
import javax.crypto.ShortBufferException;
import javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
/**
* This class implements the EAX mode using AES.
*
* EAX is an encryption mode proposed by Bellare, Rogaway and Wagner
* (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/eax.pdf). The encryption mode is an alternative to CCM
* and has been proposed as a NIST standard:
* http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/eax/eax-spec.pdf
*
*
The parameter choices have been restricted to a small set of options:
*
*
* - The tag size is always 16 bytes
*
- Nonces are chosen by the implementation at random. Their size is 12 or 16 bytes.
*
*
* Plans: The current implementation is slow since it uses JCA and only assumes that the
* encryption modes "AES/ECB/NOPADDING" and "AES/CTR/NOPADDING" are implemented. Our plan is to
* implement a native version of EAX.
*
* @since 1.0.0
*/
public final class AesEaxJce implements Aead {
public static final TinkFipsUtil.AlgorithmFipsCompatibility FIPS =
TinkFipsUtil.AlgorithmFipsCompatibility.ALGORITHM_NOT_FIPS;
private static final ThreadLocal localEcbCipher =
new ThreadLocal() {
@Override
protected Cipher initialValue() {
try {
return EngineFactory.CIPHER.getInstance("AES/ECB/NOPADDING");
} catch (GeneralSecurityException ex) {
throw new IllegalStateException(ex);
}
}
};
private static final ThreadLocal localCtrCipher =
new ThreadLocal() {
@Override
protected Cipher initialValue() {
try {
return EngineFactory.CIPHER.getInstance("AES/CTR/NOPADDING");
} catch (GeneralSecurityException ex) {
throw new IllegalStateException(ex);
}
}
};
static final int BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES = 16;
static final int TAG_SIZE_IN_BYTES = 16;
// The constants B and P derived from the key. These constants are used for computing an OMAC.
private final byte[] b;
private final byte[] p;
private final byte[] outputPrefix;
private final SecretKeySpec keySpec;
private final int ivSizeInBytes;
@AccessesPartialKey
@SuppressWarnings("InsecureCryptoUsage")
public static Aead create(AesEaxKey key) throws GeneralSecurityException {
if (!FIPS.isCompatible()) {
throw new GeneralSecurityException("Can not use AES-EAX in FIPS-mode.");
}
if (key.getParameters().getTagSizeBytes() != TAG_SIZE_IN_BYTES) {
throw new GeneralSecurityException(
"AesEaxJce only supports 16 byte tag size, not " + key.getParameters().getTagSizeBytes());
}
return new AesEaxJce(
key.getKeyBytes().toByteArray(InsecureSecretKeyAccess.get()),
key.getParameters().getIvSizeBytes(),
key.getOutputPrefix().toByteArray());
}
private AesEaxJce(final byte[] key, int ivSizeInBytes, byte[] outputPrefix)
throws GeneralSecurityException {
if (!FIPS.isCompatible()) {
throw new GeneralSecurityException("Can not use AES-EAX in FIPS-mode.");
}
if (ivSizeInBytes != 12 && ivSizeInBytes != 16) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("IV size should be either 12 or 16 bytes");
}
this.ivSizeInBytes = ivSizeInBytes;
Validators.validateAesKeySize(key.length);
keySpec = new SecretKeySpec(key, "AES");
Cipher ecb = localEcbCipher.get();
ecb.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, keySpec);
byte[] block = ecb.doFinal(new byte[BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES]);
b = multiplyByX(block);
p = multiplyByX(b);
this.outputPrefix = outputPrefix;
}
public AesEaxJce(final byte[] key, int ivSizeInBytes) throws GeneralSecurityException {
this(key, ivSizeInBytes, new byte[0]);
}
/**
* Computes the xor of two byte arrays of equal size.
*
* The output is stored in the first array.
*/
private static void xor(final byte[] x, final byte[] y) {
int len = x.length;
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
x[i] = (byte) (x[i] ^ y[i]);
}
}
/**
* Multiplies an element of the field GF(2)[x]/(x^128+x^7+x^2+x+1) by x.
*
* @param block a 16 byte block representing an element of the field using big endian order.
*/
private static byte[] multiplyByX(final byte[] block) {
byte[] res = new byte[BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES];
for (int i = 0; i < BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES - 1; i++) {
// Shifts byte array by 1 bit (this is ugly because bytes in Java are signed)
res[i] = (byte) (((block[i] << 1) ^ ((block[i + 1] & 0xff) >>> 7)) & 0xff);
}
// Shifts the least significant block by 1 bit and reduces the msb modulo the polynomial.
res[BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES - 1] =
(byte) ((block[BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES - 1] << 1) ^ ((block[0] >> 7) & 0x87));
return res;
}
/**
* Pads the last block for OMAC. If the last block is smaller than 16 bytes then a bitstring
* starting with 1 and followed by 0's is appended and the result is XORed with p. If the last
* block is 16 bytes long then the last block is XORed with b.
*/
private byte[] pad(final byte[] data, int lastBlockFrom, int lastBlockTo) {
byte[] lastBlock = Arrays.copyOfRange(data, lastBlockFrom, lastBlockTo);
if (lastBlock.length == BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES) {
xor(lastBlock, b);
return lastBlock;
} else {
byte[] res = Arrays.copyOf(p, BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES);
for (int i = 0; i < lastBlock.length; i++) {
res[i] ^= lastBlock[i];
}
res[lastBlock.length] = (byte) (res[lastBlock.length] ^ 0x80);
return res;
}
}
/**
* Computes an OMAC.
*
* @param ecb A cipher initialized with the key of this class using AES/ECB/NOPadding and
* encryption mode.
* @param tag The OMAC tag (0 for nonce, 1 for aad, 2 for ciphertext)
* @param data The array containing the data to MAC.
* @param offset The start of the data to MAC.
* @param length The length of the data to MAC.
* @return The 16 byte long OMAC
* @throws IllegalBlockSizeException, BadPaddingException This should not happen.
*/
private byte[] omac(Cipher ecb, int tag, final byte[] data, int offset, int length)
throws IllegalBlockSizeException, BadPaddingException, ShortBufferException {
assert length >= 0;
assert 0 <= tag && tag <= 3;
byte[] block = new byte[BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES];
block[BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES - 1] = (byte) tag;
if (length == 0) {
xor(block, b);
return ecb.doFinal(block);
}
byte[] buffer = new byte[BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES];
// Note that
// {@code ecb.doFinal(block, 0, BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES, /* output= */ block);} also works,
// but the performance of doing this is bad. It seems that it detects that input and output
// are the same, and then allocate some temporary memory, and copies the result back.
ecb.doFinal(block, 0, BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES, /* output= */ buffer);
byte[] temp = block; // re-use unused block as buffer.
block = buffer;
buffer = temp;
int position = 0;
while (length - position > BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES) {
for (int i = 0; i < BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES; i++) {
block[i] ^= data[offset + position + i];
}
ecb.doFinal(block, 0, BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES, /* output= */ buffer);
temp = block; // block is not needed anymore, we re-use it as buffer.
block = buffer;
buffer = temp;
position += BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES;
}
byte[] padded = pad(data, offset + position, offset + length);
xor(block, padded);
ecb.doFinal(block, 0, BLOCK_SIZE_IN_BYTES, /* output= */ buffer);
return buffer;
}
@SuppressWarnings("InsecureCryptoUsage")
@Override
public byte[] encrypt(final byte[] plaintext, final byte[] associatedData)
throws GeneralSecurityException {
// Check that ciphertext is not longer than the max. size of a Java array.
if (plaintext.length
> Integer.MAX_VALUE - outputPrefix.length - ivSizeInBytes - TAG_SIZE_IN_BYTES) {
throw new GeneralSecurityException("plaintext too long");
}
byte[] ciphertext =
Arrays.copyOf(
outputPrefix,
outputPrefix.length + ivSizeInBytes + plaintext.length + TAG_SIZE_IN_BYTES);
byte[] iv = Random.randBytes(ivSizeInBytes);
System.arraycopy(
/* src= */ iv,
/* srcPos= */ 0,
/* dest= */ ciphertext,
/* destPos= */ outputPrefix.length,
/* length= */ ivSizeInBytes);
Cipher ecb = localEcbCipher.get();
ecb.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, keySpec);
byte[] n = omac(ecb, 0, iv, 0, iv.length);
byte[] aad = associatedData;
if (aad == null) {
aad = new byte[0];
}
byte[] h = omac(ecb, 1, aad, 0, aad.length);
Cipher ctr = localCtrCipher.get();
ctr.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, keySpec, new IvParameterSpec(n));
ctr.doFinal(plaintext, 0, plaintext.length, ciphertext, outputPrefix.length + ivSizeInBytes);
byte[] t = omac(ecb, 2, ciphertext, outputPrefix.length + ivSizeInBytes, plaintext.length);
int offset = outputPrefix.length + plaintext.length + ivSizeInBytes;
for (int i = 0; i < TAG_SIZE_IN_BYTES; i++) {
ciphertext[offset + i] = (byte) (h[i] ^ n[i] ^ t[i]);
}
return ciphertext;
}
@SuppressWarnings("InsecureCryptoUsage")
@Override
public byte[] decrypt(final byte[] ciphertext, final byte[] associatedData)
throws GeneralSecurityException {
int plaintextLength =
ciphertext.length - outputPrefix.length - ivSizeInBytes - TAG_SIZE_IN_BYTES;
if (plaintextLength < 0) {
throw new GeneralSecurityException("ciphertext too short");
}
if (!isPrefix(outputPrefix, ciphertext)) {
throw new GeneralSecurityException("Decryption failed (OutputPrefix mismatch).");
}
Cipher ecb = localEcbCipher.get();
ecb.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, keySpec);
byte[] n = omac(ecb, 0, ciphertext, outputPrefix.length, ivSizeInBytes);
byte[] aad = associatedData;
if (aad == null) {
aad = new byte[0];
}
byte[] h = omac(ecb, 1, aad, 0, aad.length);
byte[] t = omac(ecb, 2, ciphertext, outputPrefix.length + ivSizeInBytes, plaintextLength);
byte res = 0;
int offset = ciphertext.length - TAG_SIZE_IN_BYTES;
for (int i = 0; i < TAG_SIZE_IN_BYTES; i++) {
res = (byte) (res | (ciphertext[offset + i] ^ h[i] ^ n[i] ^ t[i]));
}
if (res != 0) {
throw new AEADBadTagException("tag mismatch");
}
Cipher ctr = localCtrCipher.get();
ctr.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, keySpec, new IvParameterSpec(n));
return ctr.doFinal(ciphertext, outputPrefix.length + ivSizeInBytes, plaintextLength);
}
}