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/*
This is not an official specification document, and usage is restricted.


NOTICE





(c) 2005-2007 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

Neither this file nor any files generated from it describe a complete
specification, and they may only be used as described below. For
example, no permission is given for you to incorporate this file, in
whole or in part, in an implementation of a Java specification.

Sun Microsystems Inc. owns the copyright in this file and it is provided
to you for informative, as opposed to normative, use. The file and any
files generated from it may be used to generate other informative
documentation, such as a unified set of documents of API signatures for
a platform that includes technologies expressed as Java APIs. The file
may also be used to produce "compilation stubs," which allow
applications to be compiled and validated for such platforms.

Any work generated from this file, such as unified javadocs or compiled
stub files, must be accompanied by this notice in its entirety.

This work corresponds to the API signatures of JSR 219: Foundation
Profile 1.1. In the event of a discrepency between this work and the
JSR 219 specification, which is available at
http://www.jcp.org/en/jsr/detail?id=219, the latter takes precedence.
*/


  


package java.security;

import java.security.*;

import java.util.Enumeration;
import java.util.Hashtable;
import java.util.StringTokenizer;

/** 
 * This class is for security permissions.
 * A SecurityPermission contains a name (also referred to as a "target name")
 * but no actions list; you either have the named permission
 * or you don't.
 * 

 * The target name is the name of a security configuration parameter (see below).
 * Currently the SecurityPermission object is used to guard access
 * to the Policy, Security, Provider, Signer, and Identity
 * objects.
 * NOTE: java.security.Signer, java.security.Identity are found in J2ME 
 * CDC profiles such as J2ME Foundation Profile.
 * 

 * The following table lists all the possible SecurityPermission target names,
 * and for each provides a description of what the permission allows
 * and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.
 * 

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 * Permission Target Name What the Permission Allows Risks of Allowing this Permission
createAccessControlContext Creation of an AccessControlContext This allows someone to instantiate an AccessControlContext
 * with a DomainCombiner.  Since DomainCombiners are given
 * a reference to the ProtectionDomains currently on the stack,
 * this could potentially lead to a privacy leak if the DomainCombiner
 * is malicious.
getDomainCombiner Retrieval of an AccessControlContext's DomainCombiner This allows someone to retrieve an AccessControlContext's
 * DomainCombiner.  Since DomainCombiners may contain
 * sensitive information, this could potentially lead to a privacy leak.
getPolicy Retrieval of the system-wide security policy (specifically, of the
 * currently-installed Policy object) This allows someone to query the policy via the
 * getPermissions call,
 * which discloses which permissions would be granted to a given CodeSource.
 * While revealing the policy does not compromise the security of
 * the system, it does provide malicious code with additional information
 * which it may use to better aim an attack. It is wise
 * not to divulge more information than necessary.
setPolicy Setting of the system-wide security policy (specifically,
 * the Policy object) Granting this permission is extremely dangerous, as malicious
 * code may grant itself all the necessary permissions it needs
 * to successfully mount an attack on the system.
getProperty.{key} Retrieval of the security property with the specified key Depending on the particular key for which access has
 * been granted, the code may have access to the list of security
 * providers, as well as the location of the system-wide and user
 * security policies.  while revealing this information does not
 * compromise the security of the system, it does provide malicious
 * code with additional information which it may use to better aim
 * an attack.
 *
setProperty.{key} Setting of the security property with the specified key This could include setting a security provider or defining
 * the location of the the system-wide security policy.  Malicious
 * code that has permission to set a new security provider may
 * set a rogue provider that steals confidential information such
 * as cryptographic private keys. In addition, malicious code with
 * permission to set the location of the system-wide security policy
 * may point it to a security policy that grants the attacker
 * all the necessary permissions it requires to successfully mount
 * an attack on the system.
 *
insertProvider.{provider name} Addition of a new provider, with the specified name This would allow somebody to introduce a possibly
 * malicious provider (e.g., one that discloses the private keys passed
 * to it) as the highest-priority provider. This would be possible
 * because the Security object (which manages the installed providers)
 * currently does not check the integrity or authenticity of a provider
 * before attaching it.
removeProvider.{provider name} Removal of the specified provider This may change the behavior or disable execution of other
 * parts of the program. If a provider subsequently requested by the
 * program has been removed, execution may fail. Also, if the removed
 * provider is not explicitly requested by the rest of the program, but
 * it would normally be the provider chosen when a cryptography service
 * is requested (due to its previous order in the list of providers),
 * a different provider will be chosen instead, or no suitable provider
 * will be found, thereby resulting in program failure.
setSystemScope Setting of the system identity scope This would allow an attacker to configure the system identity scope with
 * certificates that should not be trusted, thereby granting applet or
 * application code signed with those certificates privileges that
 * would have been denied by the system's original identity scope
setIdentityPublicKey Setting of the public key for an Identity
 * NOTE: java.security.Identity is found in J2ME CDC profiles such as 
 * J2ME Foundation Profile. If the identity is marked as "trusted", this allows an attacker to
 * introduce a different public key (e.g., its own) that is not trusted
 * by the system's identity scope, thereby granting applet or
 * application code signed with that public key privileges that
 * would have been denied otherwise.
setIdentityInfo Setting of a general information string for an Identity
 * NOTE: java.security.Identity is found in J2ME CDC profiles such as 
 * J2ME Foundation Profile. This allows attackers to set the general description for
 * an identity.  This may trick applications into using a different
 * identity than intended or may prevent applications from finding a
 * particular identity.
addIdentityCertificate Addition of a certificate for an Identity
 * NOTE: java.security.Identity is found in J2ME CDC profiles such as 
 * J2ME Foundation Profile. This allows attackers to set a certificate for
 * an identity's public key.  This is dangerous because it affects
 * the trust relationship across the system. This public key suddenly
 * becomes trusted to a wider audience than it otherwise would be.
removeIdentityCertificate Removal of a certificate for an Identity
 * NOTE: java.security.Identity is found in J2ME CDC profiles such as 
 * J2ME Foundation Profile. This allows attackers to remove a certificate for
 * an identity's public key. This is dangerous because it affects
 * the trust relationship across the system. This public key suddenly
 * becomes considered less trustworthy than it otherwise would be.
printIdentity Viewing the name of a principal
 * and optionally the scope in which it is used, and whether
 * or not it is considered "trusted" in that scope The scope that is printed out may be a filename, in which case
 * it may convey local system information. For example, here's a sample
 * printout of an identity named "carol", who is
 * marked not trusted in the user's identity database:

 *   carol[/home/luehe/identitydb.obj][not trusted]
clearProviderProperties.{provider name} "Clearing" of a Provider so that it no longer contains the properties
 * used to look up services implemented by the provider This disables the lookup of services implemented by the provider.
 * This may thus change the behavior or disable execution of other
 * parts of the program that would normally utilize the Provider, as
 * described under the "removeProvider.{provider name}" permission.
putProviderProperty.{provider name} Setting of properties for the specified Provider The provider properties each specify the name and location
 * of a particular service implemented by the provider. By granting
 * this permission, you let code replace the service specification
 * with another one, thereby specifying a different implementation.
removeProviderProperty.{provider name} Removal of properties from the specified Provider This disables the lookup of services implemented by the
 * provider. They are no longer accessible due to removal of the properties
 * specifying their names and locations. This
 * may change the behavior or disable execution of other
 * parts of the program that would normally utilize the Provider, as
 * described under the "removeProvider.{provider name}" permission.
getSignerPrivateKey Retrieval of a Signer's private key It is very dangerous to allow access to a private key; private
 * keys are supposed to be kept secret. Otherwise, code can use the
 * private key to sign various files and claim the signature came from
 * the Signer.
 * NOTE: java.security.Signer is found in J2ME CDC profiles such as 
 * J2ME Foundation Profile.
setSignerKeyPair Setting of the key pair (public key and private key) for a Signer This would allow an attacker to replace somebody else's (the "target's")
 * keypair with a possibly weaker keypair (e.g., a keypair of a smaller
 * keysize).  This also would allow the attacker to listen in on encrypted
 * communication between the target and its peers. The target's peers
 * might wrap an encryption session key under the target's "new" public
 * key, which would allow the attacker (who possesses the corresponding
 * private key) to unwrap the session key and decipher the communication
 * data encrypted under that session key.
 *
 * @see java.security.BasicPermission
 * @see java.security.Permission
 * @see java.security.Permissions
 * @see java.security.PermissionCollection
 * @see java.lang.SecurityManager
 *
 * @version 1.21 00/02/02
 *
 * @author Marianne Mueller
 * @author Roland Schemers
 */
public final class SecurityPermission extends java.security.BasicPermission
{

    /** 
     * Creates a new SecurityPermission with the specified name.
     * The name is the symbolic name of the SecurityPermission. An asterisk
     * may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to
     * signify a wildcard match.
     *
     * @param name the name of the SecurityPermission
     */
    public SecurityPermission(String name) { 
	super(name);    
    }

    /** 
     * Creates a new SecurityPermission object with the specified name.
     * The name is the symbolic name of the SecurityPermission, and the
     * actions String is currently unused and should be null.
     *
     * @param name the name of the SecurityPermission
     * @param actions should be null.
     */
    public SecurityPermission(String name, String actions) { 
	super(name, actions);    
    }
}

Permission Target Name	What the Permission Allows	Risks of Allowing this Permission
createAccessControlContext	Creation of an AccessControlContext	This allows someone to instantiate an AccessControlContext * with a `DomainCombiner`. Since DomainCombiners are given * a reference to the ProtectionDomains currently on the stack, * this could potentially lead to a privacy leak if the DomainCombiner * is malicious.
getDomainCombiner	Retrieval of an AccessControlContext's DomainCombiner	This allows someone to retrieve an AccessControlContext's * `DomainCombiner`. Since DomainCombiners may contain * sensitive information, this could potentially lead to a privacy leak.
getPolicy	Retrieval of the system-wide security policy (specifically, of the * currently-installed Policy object)	This allows someone to query the policy via the * `getPermissions` call, * which discloses which permissions would be granted to a given CodeSource. * While revealing the policy does not compromise the security of * the system, it does provide malicious code with additional information * which it may use to better aim an attack. It is wise * not to divulge more information than necessary.
setPolicy	Setting of the system-wide security policy (specifically, * the Policy object)	Granting this permission is extremely dangerous, as malicious * code may grant itself all the necessary permissions it needs * to successfully mount an attack on the system.
getProperty.{key}	Retrieval of the security property with the specified key	Depending on the particular key for which access has * been granted, the code may have access to the list of security * providers, as well as the location of the system-wide and user * security policies. while revealing this information does not * compromise the security of the system, it does provide malicious * code with additional information which it may use to better aim * an attack. *
setProperty.{key}	Setting of the security property with the specified key	This could include setting a security provider or defining * the location of the the system-wide security policy. Malicious * code that has permission to set a new security provider may * set a rogue provider that steals confidential information such * as cryptographic private keys. In addition, malicious code with * permission to set the location of the system-wide security policy * may point it to a security policy that grants the attacker * all the necessary permissions it requires to successfully mount * an attack on the system. *
insertProvider.{provider name}	Addition of a new provider, with the specified name	This would allow somebody to introduce a possibly * malicious provider (e.g., one that discloses the private keys passed * to it) as the highest-priority provider. This would be possible * because the Security object (which manages the installed providers) * currently does not check the integrity or authenticity of a provider * before attaching it.
removeProvider.{provider name}	Removal of the specified provider	This may change the behavior or disable execution of other * parts of the program. If a provider subsequently requested by the * program has been removed, execution may fail. Also, if the removed * provider is not explicitly requested by the rest of the program, but * it would normally be the provider chosen when a cryptography service * is requested (due to its previous order in the list of providers), * a different provider will be chosen instead, or no suitable provider * will be found, thereby resulting in program failure.
setSystemScope	Setting of the system identity scope	This would allow an attacker to configure the system identity scope with * certificates that should not be trusted, thereby granting applet or * application code signed with those certificates privileges that * would have been denied by the system's original identity scope
setIdentityPublicKey	Setting of the public key for an Identity * NOTE: java.security.Identity is found in J2ME CDC profiles such as * J2ME Foundation Profile.	If the identity is marked as "trusted", this allows an attacker to * introduce a different public key (e.g., its own) that is not trusted * by the system's identity scope, thereby granting applet or * application code signed with that public key privileges that * would have been denied otherwise.
setIdentityInfo	Setting of a general information string for an Identity * NOTE: java.security.Identity is found in J2ME CDC profiles such as * J2ME Foundation Profile.	This allows attackers to set the general description for * an identity. This may trick applications into using a different * identity than intended or may prevent applications from finding a * particular identity.
addIdentityCertificate	Addition of a certificate for an Identity * NOTE: java.security.Identity is found in J2ME CDC profiles such as * J2ME Foundation Profile.	This allows attackers to set a certificate for * an identity's public key. This is dangerous because it affects * the trust relationship across the system. This public key suddenly * becomes trusted to a wider audience than it otherwise would be.
removeIdentityCertificate	Removal of a certificate for an Identity * NOTE: java.security.Identity is found in J2ME CDC profiles such as * J2ME Foundation Profile.	This allows attackers to remove a certificate for * an identity's public key. This is dangerous because it affects * the trust relationship across the system. This public key suddenly * becomes considered less trustworthy than it otherwise would be.
printIdentity	Viewing the name of a principal * and optionally the scope in which it is used, and whether * or not it is considered "trusted" in that scope	The scope that is printed out may be a filename, in which case * it may convey local system information. For example, here's a sample * printout of an identity named "carol", who is * marked not trusted in the user's identity database: * carol[/home/luehe/identitydb.obj][not trusted]
clearProviderProperties.{provider name}	"Clearing" of a Provider so that it no longer contains the properties * used to look up services implemented by the provider	This disables the lookup of services implemented by the provider. * This may thus change the behavior or disable execution of other * parts of the program that would normally utilize the Provider, as * described under the "removeProvider.{provider name}" permission.
putProviderProperty.{provider name}	Setting of properties for the specified Provider	The provider properties each specify the name and location * of a particular service implemented by the provider. By granting * this permission, you let code replace the service specification * with another one, thereby specifying a different implementation.
removeProviderProperty.{provider name}	Removal of properties from the specified Provider	This disables the lookup of services implemented by the * provider. They are no longer accessible due to removal of the properties * specifying their names and locations. This * may change the behavior or disable execution of other * parts of the program that would normally utilize the Provider, as * described under the "removeProvider.{provider name}" permission.
getSignerPrivateKey	Retrieval of a Signer's private key	It is very dangerous to allow access to a private key; private * keys are supposed to be kept secret. Otherwise, code can use the * private key to sign various files and claim the signature came from * the Signer. * NOTE: java.security.Signer is found in J2ME CDC profiles such as * J2ME Foundation Profile.
setSignerKeyPair	Setting of the key pair (public key and private key) for a Signer	This would allow an attacker to replace somebody else's (the "target's") * keypair with a possibly weaker keypair (e.g., a keypair of a smaller * keysize). This also would allow the attacker to listen in on encrypted * communication between the target and its peers. The target's peers * might wrap an encryption session key under the target's "new" public * key, which would allow the attacker (who possesses the corresponding * private key) to unwrap the session key and decipher the communication * data encrypted under that session key.

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