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Elasticsearch subproject :server
/*
* Licensed to Elasticsearch under one or more contributor
* license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with
* this work for additional information regarding copyright
* ownership. Elasticsearch licenses this file to you under
* the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
* software distributed under the License is distributed on an
* "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
* KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
* specific language governing permissions and limitations
* under the License.
*/
package org.elasticsearch.bootstrap;
import org.elasticsearch.common.SuppressForbidden;
import java.io.FilePermission;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.net.SocketPermission;
import java.net.URL;
import java.security.CodeSource;
import java.security.Permission;
import java.security.PermissionCollection;
import java.security.Permissions;
import java.security.Policy;
import java.security.ProtectionDomain;
import java.util.Collections;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.function.Predicate;
/** custom policy for union of static and dynamic permissions */
final class ESPolicy extends Policy {
/** template policy file, the one used in tests */
static final String POLICY_RESOURCE = "security.policy";
/** limited policy for scripts */
static final String UNTRUSTED_RESOURCE = "untrusted.policy";
final Policy template;
final Policy untrusted;
final Policy system;
final PermissionCollection dynamic;
final Map plugins;
ESPolicy(Map codebases, PermissionCollection dynamic, Map plugins, boolean filterBadDefaults) {
this.template = Security.readPolicy(getClass().getResource(POLICY_RESOURCE), codebases);
this.untrusted = Security.readPolicy(getClass().getResource(UNTRUSTED_RESOURCE), Collections.emptyMap());
if (filterBadDefaults) {
this.system = new SystemPolicy(Policy.getPolicy());
} else {
this.system = Policy.getPolicy();
}
this.dynamic = dynamic;
this.plugins = plugins;
}
@Override @SuppressForbidden(reason = "fast equals check is desired")
public boolean implies(ProtectionDomain domain, Permission permission) {
CodeSource codeSource = domain.getCodeSource();
// codesource can be null when reducing privileges via doPrivileged()
if (codeSource == null) {
return false;
}
URL location = codeSource.getLocation();
// location can be null... ??? nobody knows
// https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8129972
if (location != null) {
// run scripts with limited permissions
if (BootstrapInfo.UNTRUSTED_CODEBASE.equals(location.getFile())) {
return untrusted.implies(domain, permission);
}
// check for an additional plugin permission: plugin policy is
// only consulted for its codesources.
Policy plugin = plugins.get(location.getFile());
if (plugin != null && plugin.implies(domain, permission)) {
return true;
}
}
// Special handling for broken Hadoop code: "let me execute or my classes will not load"
// yeah right, REMOVE THIS when hadoop is fixed
if (permission instanceof FilePermission && "<>".equals(permission.getName())) {
for (StackTraceElement element : Thread.currentThread().getStackTrace()) {
if ("org.apache.hadoop.util.Shell".equals(element.getClassName()) &&
"runCommand".equals(element.getMethodName())) {
// we found the horrible method: the hack begins!
// force the hadoop code to back down, by throwing an exception that it catches.
rethrow(new IOException("no hadoop, you cannot do this."));
}
}
}
// otherwise defer to template + dynamic file permissions
return template.implies(domain, permission) || dynamic.implies(permission) || system.implies(domain, permission);
}
/**
* Classy puzzler to rethrow any checked exception as an unchecked one.
*/
private static class Rethrower {
private void rethrow(Throwable t) throws T {
throw (T) t;
}
}
/**
* Rethrows t (identical object).
*/
private void rethrow(Throwable t) {
new Rethrower().rethrow(t);
}
@Override
public PermissionCollection getPermissions(CodeSource codesource) {
// code should not rely on this method, or at least use it correctly:
// https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8014008
// return them a new empty permissions object so jvisualvm etc work
for (StackTraceElement element : Thread.currentThread().getStackTrace()) {
if ("sun.rmi.server.LoaderHandler".equals(element.getClassName()) &&
"loadClass".equals(element.getMethodName())) {
return new Permissions();
}
}
// return UNSUPPORTED_EMPTY_COLLECTION since it is safe.
return super.getPermissions(codesource);
}
// TODO: remove this hack when insecure defaults are removed from java
/**
* Wraps a bad default permission, applying a pre-implies to any permissions before checking if the wrapped bad default permission
* implies a permission.
*/
private static class BadDefaultPermission extends Permission {
private final Permission badDefaultPermission;
private final Predicate preImplies;
/**
* Construct an instance with a pre-implies check to apply to desired permissions.
*
* @param badDefaultPermission the bad default permission to wrap
* @param preImplies a test that is applied to a desired permission before checking if the bad default permission that
* this instance wraps implies the desired permission
*/
BadDefaultPermission(final Permission badDefaultPermission, final Predicate preImplies) {
super(badDefaultPermission.getName());
this.badDefaultPermission = badDefaultPermission;
this.preImplies = preImplies;
}
@Override
public final boolean implies(Permission permission) {
return preImplies.test(permission) && badDefaultPermission.implies(permission);
}
@Override
public final boolean equals(Object obj) {
return badDefaultPermission.equals(obj);
}
@Override
public int hashCode() {
return badDefaultPermission.hashCode();
}
@Override
public String getActions() {
return badDefaultPermission.getActions();
}
}
// default policy file states:
// "It is strongly recommended that you either remove this permission
// from this policy file or further restrict it to code sources
// that you specify, because Thread.stop() is potentially unsafe."
// not even sure this method still works...
private static final Permission BAD_DEFAULT_NUMBER_ONE = new BadDefaultPermission(new RuntimePermission("stopThread"), p -> true);
// default policy file states:
// "allows anyone to listen on dynamic ports"
// specified exactly because that is what we want, and fastest since it won't imply any
// expensive checks for the implicit "resolve"
private static final Permission BAD_DEFAULT_NUMBER_TWO =
new BadDefaultPermission(
new SocketPermission("localhost:0", "listen"),
// we apply this pre-implies test because some SocketPermission#implies calls do expensive reverse-DNS resolves
p -> p instanceof SocketPermission && p.getActions().contains("listen"));
/**
* Wraps the Java system policy, filtering out bad default permissions that
* are granted to all domains. Note, before java 8 these were even worse.
*/
static class SystemPolicy extends Policy {
final Policy delegate;
SystemPolicy(Policy delegate) {
this.delegate = delegate;
}
@Override
public boolean implies(ProtectionDomain domain, Permission permission) {
if (BAD_DEFAULT_NUMBER_ONE.implies(permission) || BAD_DEFAULT_NUMBER_TWO.implies(permission)) {
return false;
}
return delegate.implies(domain, permission);
}
}
}
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