com.google.gwt.safecss.shared.SafeStyles Maven / Gradle / Ivy
/*
* Copyright 2011 Google Inc.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not
* use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of
* the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the
* License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations under
* the License.
*/
package com.google.gwt.safecss.shared;
import java.io.Serializable;
/**
* An object that implements this interface encapsulates zero or more CSS
* properties that are guaranteed to be safe to use (with respect to potential
* Cross-Site-Scripting vulnerabilities) in a CSS (Cascading Style Sheet)
* attribute context. A CSS attribute context can be inside of a CSS rule in a
* {@code style} element, or inside the {@code style} attribute of a DOM
* element.
*
*
* Note on usage: {@link SafeStyles} should be used to ensure user input is not
* executed in the browser. {@link SafeStyles} should not be used to sanitize
* input before sending it to the server: The server cannot rely on the type
* contract of {@link SafeStyles} values received from clients, because a
* malicious client could provide maliciously crafted serialized forms of
* implementations of this type that violate the type contract.
*
*
* All implementing classes must maintain the class invariant (by design and
* implementation and/or convention of use), that invoking {@link #asString()}
* on any instance will return a string that is safe to assign to a CSS
* attribute in a browser, in the sense that doing so must not cause execution
* of script in the browser. Generally, {@link SafeStyles} should be of the form
* {@code cssPropertyName:value;}, where neither the name nor the value contain
* malicious scripts.
*
*
* {@link SafeStyles} may never contain literal angle brackets. Otherwise, it
* could be unsafe to place a {@link SafeStyles} into a <style> tag (where
* it can't be HTML escaped). For example, if the {@link SafeStyles} containing
* "font: 'foo <style><script>evil</script>'" is
* used in a style sheet in a <style> tag, this could then break out of
* the style context into HTML.
*
*
* {@link SafeStyles} may contain literal single or double quotes, and as such
* the entire style string must be escaped when used in a style attribute (if
* this were not the case, the string could contain a matching quote that would
* escape from the style attribute).
*
*
* Furthermore, values of this type must be composable, i.e. for any two values
* {@code A} and {@code B} of this type, {@code A.asString() + B.asString()}
* must itself be a value that satisfies the {@link SafeStyles} type constraint.
* This requirement implies that for any value {@code A} of this type,
* {@code A.asString()} must not end in a "CSS value" or "CSS name" context. For
* example, a value of {@code background:url("} or {@code font-} would not
* satisfy the {@link SafeStyles} contract. This is because concatenating such
* strings with a second value that itself does not contain unsafe CSS can
* result in an overall string that does. For example, if
* {@code javascript:evil())"} is appended to {@code background:url("}, the
* resulting string may result in the execution of a malicious script.
*
*
* The following example values comply with this type's contract:
*
* width: 1em;height:1em;width: 1em;height: 1em;background:url('http://url');
* In addition, the empty string is safe for use in a CSS attribute.
*
*
* The following example values do not comply with this type's contract:
*
* background: red (missing a trailing semi-colon)background: (missing a value and a trailing semi-colon)1em (missing an attribute name, which provides context for the value)
*
*
* All implementations must implement equals() and hashCode() to behave
* consistently with the result of asString().equals() and asString.hashCode().
*
*
* Implementations must not return {@code null} from {@link #asString()}.
*/
public interface SafeStyles extends Serializable {
/*
* Notes regarding serialization:
*
* - It may be reasonable to allow deserialization on the client of objects
* serialized on the server (i.e. RPC responses), based on the assumption that
* server code is trusted and would not provide a malicious serialized form
* (if a MitM were able to modify server responses, the client would be fully
* compromised in any case). However, the GWT RPC framework currently does not
* seem to provide a facility for restricting deserialization on the Server
* only (though this shouldn't be difficult to implement through a custom
* SerializationPolicy)
*
* - Some implementations of SafeStyles would in principle be able to enforce
* their class invariant on deserialization. However, the GWT RPC framework
* does not provide for an equivalent of readResolve() to enforce the class
* invariant on deserialization.
*/
/**
* Returns this object's contained CSS as a string.
*
*
* Based on this class' contract, the returned value will be non-null and a
* string that is safe to use in an CSS attribute context.
*
* @return the contents as a String
*/
String asString();
/**
* Compares this string to the specified object. Must be equal to
* asString().equals().
*
* @param anObject the object to compare to
*/
boolean equals(Object anObject);
/**
* Returns a hash code for this string. Must be equal to
* asString().hashCode().
*/
int hashCode();
}