org.bouncycastle.crypto.agreement.jpake.JPAKEUtil Maven / Gradle / Ivy
Show all versions of org.apache.servicemix.bundles.bcprov-jdk15on
package org.bouncycastle.crypto.agreement.jpake;
import java.math.BigInteger;
import java.security.SecureRandom;
import org.bouncycastle.crypto.CryptoException;
import org.bouncycastle.crypto.Digest;
import org.bouncycastle.crypto.Mac;
import org.bouncycastle.crypto.macs.HMac;
import org.bouncycastle.crypto.params.KeyParameter;
import org.bouncycastle.util.Arrays;
import org.bouncycastle.util.BigIntegers;
import org.bouncycastle.util.Strings;
/**
* Primitives needed for a J-PAKE exchange.
*
* The recommended way to perform a J-PAKE exchange is by using
* two {@link JPAKEParticipant}s. Internally, those participants
* call these primitive operations in {@link JPAKEUtil}.
*
* The primitives, however, can be used without a {@link JPAKEParticipant}
* if needed.
*/
public class JPAKEUtil
{
static final BigInteger ZERO = BigInteger.valueOf(0);
static final BigInteger ONE = BigInteger.valueOf(1);
/**
* Return a value that can be used as x1 or x3 during round 1.
*
* The returned value is a random value in the range [0, q-1].
*/
public static BigInteger generateX1(
BigInteger q,
SecureRandom random)
{
BigInteger min = ZERO;
BigInteger max = q.subtract(ONE);
return BigIntegers.createRandomInRange(min, max, random);
}
/**
* Return a value that can be used as x2 or x4 during round 1.
*
* The returned value is a random value in the range [1, q-1].
*/
public static BigInteger generateX2(
BigInteger q,
SecureRandom random)
{
BigInteger min = ONE;
BigInteger max = q.subtract(ONE);
return BigIntegers.createRandomInRange(min, max, random);
}
/**
* Converts the given password to a {@link BigInteger}
* for use in arithmetic calculations.
*/
public static BigInteger calculateS(char[] password)
{
return new BigInteger(Strings.toUTF8ByteArray(password));
}
/**
* Calculate g^x mod p as done in round 1.
*/
public static BigInteger calculateGx(
BigInteger p,
BigInteger g,
BigInteger x)
{
return g.modPow(x, p);
}
/**
* Calculate ga as done in round 2.
*/
public static BigInteger calculateGA(
BigInteger p,
BigInteger gx1,
BigInteger gx3,
BigInteger gx4)
{
// ga = g^(x1+x3+x4) = g^x1 * g^x3 * g^x4
return gx1.multiply(gx3).multiply(gx4).mod(p);
}
/**
* Calculate x2 * s as done in round 2.
*/
public static BigInteger calculateX2s(
BigInteger q,
BigInteger x2,
BigInteger s)
{
return x2.multiply(s).mod(q);
}
/**
* Calculate A as done in round 2.
*/
public static BigInteger calculateA(
BigInteger p,
BigInteger q,
BigInteger gA,
BigInteger x2s)
{
// A = ga^(x*s)
return gA.modPow(x2s, p);
}
/**
* Calculate a zero knowledge proof of x using Schnorr's signature.
* The returned array has two elements {g^v, r = v-x*h} for x.
*/
public static BigInteger[] calculateZeroKnowledgeProof(
BigInteger p,
BigInteger q,
BigInteger g,
BigInteger gx,
BigInteger x,
String participantId,
Digest digest,
SecureRandom random)
{
BigInteger[] zeroKnowledgeProof = new BigInteger[2];
/* Generate a random v, and compute g^v */
BigInteger vMin = ZERO;
BigInteger vMax = q.subtract(ONE);
BigInteger v = BigIntegers.createRandomInRange(vMin, vMax, random);
BigInteger gv = g.modPow(v, p);
BigInteger h = calculateHashForZeroKnowledgeProof(g, gv, gx, participantId, digest); // h
zeroKnowledgeProof[0] = gv;
zeroKnowledgeProof[1] = v.subtract(x.multiply(h)).mod(q); // r = v-x*h
return zeroKnowledgeProof;
}
private static BigInteger calculateHashForZeroKnowledgeProof(
BigInteger g,
BigInteger gr,
BigInteger gx,
String participantId,
Digest digest)
{
digest.reset();
updateDigestIncludingSize(digest, g);
updateDigestIncludingSize(digest, gr);
updateDigestIncludingSize(digest, gx);
updateDigestIncludingSize(digest, participantId);
byte[] output = new byte[digest.getDigestSize()];
digest.doFinal(output, 0);
return new BigInteger(output);
}
/**
* Validates that g^x4 is not 1.
*
* @throws CryptoException if g^x4 is 1
*/
public static void validateGx4(BigInteger gx4)
throws CryptoException
{
if (gx4.equals(ONE))
{
throw new CryptoException("g^x validation failed. g^x should not be 1.");
}
}
/**
* Validates that ga is not 1.
*
* As described by Feng Hao...
*
*
* Alice could simply check ga != 1 to ensure it is a generator.
* In fact, as we will explain in Section 3, (x1 + x3 + x4 ) is random over Zq even in the face of active attacks.
* Hence, the probability for ga = 1 is extremely small - on the order of 2^160 for 160-bit q.
*
*
* @throws CryptoException if ga is 1
*/
public static void validateGa(BigInteger ga)
throws CryptoException
{
if (ga.equals(ONE))
{
throw new CryptoException("ga is equal to 1. It should not be. The chances of this happening are on the order of 2^160 for a 160-bit q. Try again.");
}
}
/**
* Validates the zero knowledge proof (generated by
* {@link #calculateZeroKnowledgeProof(BigInteger, BigInteger, BigInteger, BigInteger, BigInteger, String, Digest, SecureRandom)})
* is correct.
*
* @throws CryptoException if the zero knowledge proof is not correct
*/
public static void validateZeroKnowledgeProof(
BigInteger p,
BigInteger q,
BigInteger g,
BigInteger gx,
BigInteger[] zeroKnowledgeProof,
String participantId,
Digest digest)
throws CryptoException
{
/* sig={g^v,r} */
BigInteger gv = zeroKnowledgeProof[0];
BigInteger r = zeroKnowledgeProof[1];
BigInteger h = calculateHashForZeroKnowledgeProof(g, gv, gx, participantId, digest);
if (!(gx.compareTo(ZERO) == 1 && // g^x > 0
gx.compareTo(p) == -1 && // g^x < p
gx.modPow(q, p).compareTo(ONE) == 0 && // g^x^q mod q = 1
/*
* Below, I took an straightforward way to compute g^r * g^x^h,
* which needs 2 exp. Using a simultaneous computation technique
* would only need 1 exp.
*/
g.modPow(r, p).multiply(gx.modPow(h, p)).mod(p).compareTo(gv) == 0)) // g^v=g^r * g^x^h
{
throw new CryptoException("Zero-knowledge proof validation failed");
}
}
/**
* Calculates the keying material, which can be done after round 2 has completed.
* A session key must be derived from this key material using a secure key derivation function (KDF).
* The KDF used to derive the key is handled externally (i.e. not by {@link JPAKEParticipant}).
*
* KeyingMaterial = (B/g^{x2*x4*s})^x2
*
*/
public static BigInteger calculateKeyingMaterial(
BigInteger p,
BigInteger q,
BigInteger gx4,
BigInteger x2,
BigInteger s,
BigInteger B)
{
return gx4.modPow(x2.multiply(s).negate().mod(q), p).multiply(B).modPow(x2, p);
}
/**
* Validates that the given participant ids are not equal.
* (For the J-PAKE exchange, each participant must use a unique id.)
*
* @throws CryptoException if the participantId strings are equal.
*/
public static void validateParticipantIdsDiffer(String participantId1, String participantId2)
throws CryptoException
{
if (participantId1.equals(participantId2))
{
throw new CryptoException(
"Both participants are using the same participantId ("
+ participantId1
+ "). This is not allowed. "
+ "Each participant must use a unique participantId.");
}
}
/**
* Validates that the given participant ids are equal.
* This is used to ensure that the payloads received from
* each round all come from the same participant.
*
* @throws CryptoException if the participantId strings are equal.
*/
public static void validateParticipantIdsEqual(String expectedParticipantId, String actualParticipantId)
throws CryptoException
{
if (!expectedParticipantId.equals(actualParticipantId))
{
throw new CryptoException(
"Received payload from incorrect partner ("
+ actualParticipantId
+ "). Expected to receive payload from "
+ expectedParticipantId
+ ".");
}
}
/**
* Validates that the given object is not null.
*
* @param object object in question
* @param description name of the object (to be used in exception message)
* @throws NullPointerException if the object is null.
*/
public static void validateNotNull(Object object, String description)
{
if (object == null)
{
throw new NullPointerException(description + " must not be null");
}
}
/**
* Calculates the MacTag (to be used for key confirmation), as defined by
* NIST SP 800-56A Revision 1,
* Section 8.2 Unilateral Key Confirmation for Key Agreement Schemes.
*
* MacTag = HMAC(MacKey, MacLen, MacData)
*
* MacKey = H(K || "JPAKE_KC")
*
* MacData = "KC_1_U" || participantId || partnerParticipantId || gx1 || gx2 || gx3 || gx4
*
* Note that both participants use "KC_1_U" because the sender of the round 3 message
* is always the initiator for key confirmation.
*
* HMAC = {@link HMac} used with the given {@link Digest}
* H = The given {@link Digest}
* MacLen = length of MacTag
*
*/
public static BigInteger calculateMacTag(
String participantId,
String partnerParticipantId,
BigInteger gx1,
BigInteger gx2,
BigInteger gx3,
BigInteger gx4,
BigInteger keyingMaterial,
Digest digest)
{
byte[] macKey = calculateMacKey(
keyingMaterial,
digest);
HMac mac = new HMac(digest);
byte[] macOutput = new byte[mac.getMacSize()];
mac.init(new KeyParameter(macKey));
/*
* MacData = "KC_1_U" || participantId_Alice || participantId_Bob || gx1 || gx2 || gx3 || gx4.
*/
updateMac(mac, "KC_1_U");
updateMac(mac, participantId);
updateMac(mac, partnerParticipantId);
updateMac(mac, gx1);
updateMac(mac, gx2);
updateMac(mac, gx3);
updateMac(mac, gx4);
mac.doFinal(macOutput, 0);
Arrays.fill(macKey, (byte)0);
return new BigInteger(macOutput);
}
/**
* Calculates the MacKey (i.e. the key to use when calculating the MagTag for key confirmation).
*
* MacKey = H(K || "JPAKE_KC")
*
*/
private static byte[] calculateMacKey(BigInteger keyingMaterial, Digest digest)
{
digest.reset();
updateDigest(digest, keyingMaterial);
/*
* This constant is used to ensure that the macKey is NOT the same as the derived key.
*/
updateDigest(digest, "JPAKE_KC");
byte[] output = new byte[digest.getDigestSize()];
digest.doFinal(output, 0);
return output;
}
/**
* Validates the MacTag received from the partner participant.
*
* @param partnerMacTag the MacTag received from the partner.
* @throws CryptoException if the participantId strings are equal.
*/
public static void validateMacTag(
String participantId,
String partnerParticipantId,
BigInteger gx1,
BigInteger gx2,
BigInteger gx3,
BigInteger gx4,
BigInteger keyingMaterial,
Digest digest,
BigInteger partnerMacTag)
throws CryptoException
{
/*
* Calculate the expected MacTag using the parameters as the partner
* would have used when the partner called calculateMacTag.
*
* i.e. basically all the parameters are reversed.
* participantId <-> partnerParticipantId
* x1 <-> x3
* x2 <-> x4
*/
BigInteger expectedMacTag = calculateMacTag(
partnerParticipantId,
participantId,
gx3,
gx4,
gx1,
gx2,
keyingMaterial,
digest);
if (!expectedMacTag.equals(partnerMacTag))
{
throw new CryptoException(
"Partner MacTag validation failed. "
+ "Therefore, the password, MAC, or digest algorithm of each participant does not match.");
}
}
private static void updateDigest(Digest digest, BigInteger bigInteger)
{
byte[] byteArray = BigIntegers.asUnsignedByteArray(bigInteger);
digest.update(byteArray, 0, byteArray.length);
Arrays.fill(byteArray, (byte)0);
}
private static void updateDigestIncludingSize(Digest digest, BigInteger bigInteger)
{
byte[] byteArray = BigIntegers.asUnsignedByteArray(bigInteger);
digest.update(intToByteArray(byteArray.length), 0, 4);
digest.update(byteArray, 0, byteArray.length);
Arrays.fill(byteArray, (byte)0);
}
private static void updateDigest(Digest digest, String string)
{
byte[] byteArray = Strings.toUTF8ByteArray(string);
digest.update(byteArray, 0, byteArray.length);
Arrays.fill(byteArray, (byte)0);
}
private static void updateDigestIncludingSize(Digest digest, String string)
{
byte[] byteArray = Strings.toUTF8ByteArray(string);
digest.update(intToByteArray(byteArray.length), 0, 4);
digest.update(byteArray, 0, byteArray.length);
Arrays.fill(byteArray, (byte)0);
}
private static void updateMac(Mac mac, BigInteger bigInteger)
{
byte[] byteArray = BigIntegers.asUnsignedByteArray(bigInteger);
mac.update(byteArray, 0, byteArray.length);
Arrays.fill(byteArray, (byte)0);
}
private static void updateMac(Mac mac, String string)
{
byte[] byteArray = Strings.toUTF8ByteArray(string);
mac.update(byteArray, 0, byteArray.length);
Arrays.fill(byteArray, (byte)0);
}
private static byte[] intToByteArray(int value)
{
return new byte[]{
(byte)(value >>> 24),
(byte)(value >>> 16),
(byte)(value >>> 8),
(byte)value
};
}
}