org.apache.sshd.common.file.root.RootedFileSystemUtils Maven / Gradle / Ivy
The newest version!
/*
* Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one
* or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file
* distributed with this work for additional information
* regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file
* to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
* "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
* with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
* software distributed under the License is distributed on an
* "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
* KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
* specific language governing permissions and limitations
* under the License.
*/
package org.apache.sshd.common.file.root;
import java.nio.file.InvalidPathException;
import java.nio.file.Path;
/**
* Utility functions for rooted file utils
*/
public final class RootedFileSystemUtils {
private RootedFileSystemUtils() {
// do not construct
}
/**
* Validate that the relative path target is safe. This means that at no point in the path can there be more ".."
* than path parts.
*
* @param target the target directory to validate is safe.
*/
public static void validateSafeRelativeSymlink(Path target) {
int numNames = 0;
int numCdUps = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < target.getNameCount(); i++) {
if ("..".equals(target.getName(i).toString())) {
numCdUps++;
} else if (!".".equals(target.getName(i).toString())) {
numNames++;
}
// need to check at each part to prevent data leakage outside of chroot
if (numCdUps > numNames) {
throw new InvalidPathException(target.toString(), "Symlink would exit chroot: " + target);
}
}
}
}
© 2015 - 2024 Weber Informatics LLC | Privacy Policy