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The Bouncy Castle Java APIs for the TLS, including a JSSE provider. The APIs are designed primarily to be used in conjunction with the BC FIPS provider. The APIs may also be used with other providers although if being used in a FIPS context it is the responsibility of the user to ensure that any other providers used are FIPS certified and used appropriately.
package org.bouncycastle.tls;
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.io.OutputStream;
import java.util.Enumeration;
import java.util.Hashtable;
import java.util.Vector;
import org.bouncycastle.tls.crypto.TlsAgreement;
import org.bouncycastle.tls.crypto.TlsSecret;
import org.bouncycastle.tls.crypto.TlsStreamSigner;
import org.bouncycastle.util.Arrays;
import org.bouncycastle.util.Integers;
public class TlsClientProtocol
extends TlsProtocol
{
protected TlsClient tlsClient = null;
TlsClientContextImpl tlsClientContext = null;
protected Hashtable clientAgreements = null;
OfferedPsks.BindersConfig clientBinders = null;
protected ClientHello clientHello = null;
protected TlsKeyExchange keyExchange = null;
protected TlsAuthentication authentication = null;
protected CertificateStatus certificateStatus = null;
protected CertificateRequest certificateRequest = null;
/**
* Constructor for non-blocking mode.
*
* When data is received, use {@link #offerInput(byte[])} to provide the received ciphertext,
* then use {@link #readInput(byte[], int, int)} to read the corresponding cleartext.
*
* Similarly, when data needs to be sent, use {@link #writeApplicationData(byte[], int, int)} to
* provide the cleartext, then use {@link #readOutput(byte[], int, int)} to get the
* corresponding ciphertext.
*/
public TlsClientProtocol()
{
super();
}
/**
* Constructor for blocking mode.
* @param input The stream of data from the server
* @param output The stream of data to the server
*/
public TlsClientProtocol(InputStream input, OutputStream output)
{
super(input, output);
}
/**
* Initiates a TLS handshake in the role of client.
*
* In blocking mode, this will not return until the handshake is complete.
* In non-blocking mode, use {@link TlsPeer#notifyHandshakeComplete()} to
* receive a callback when the handshake is complete.
*
* @param tlsClient The {@link TlsClient} to use for the handshake.
* @throws IOException If in blocking mode and handshake was not successful.
*/
public void connect(TlsClient tlsClient) throws IOException
{
if (tlsClient == null)
{
throw new IllegalArgumentException("'tlsClient' cannot be null");
}
if (this.tlsClient != null)
{
throw new IllegalStateException("'connect' can only be called once");
}
this.tlsClient = tlsClient;
this.tlsClientContext = new TlsClientContextImpl(tlsClient.getCrypto());
tlsClient.init(tlsClientContext);
tlsClient.notifyCloseHandle(this);
beginHandshake(false);
if (blocking)
{
blockForHandshake();
}
}
// public boolean renegotiate() throws IOException
// {
// boolean allowed = super.renegotiate();
// if (allowed)
// {
// beginHandshake(true);
// }
// return allowed;
// }
protected void beginHandshake(boolean renegotiation) throws IOException
{
super.beginHandshake(renegotiation);
sendClientHello();
this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_HELLO;
}
protected void cleanupHandshake()
{
super.cleanupHandshake();
this.clientAgreements = null;
this.clientBinders = null;
this.clientHello = null;
this.keyExchange = null;
this.authentication = null;
this.certificateStatus = null;
this.certificateRequest = null;
}
protected TlsContext getContext()
{
return tlsClientContext;
}
AbstractTlsContext getContextAdmin()
{
return tlsClientContext;
}
protected TlsPeer getPeer()
{
return tlsClient;
}
protected void handle13HandshakeMessage(short type, HandshakeMessageInput buf)
throws IOException
{
if (!isTLSv13ConnectionState())
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
switch (type)
{
case HandshakeType.certificate:
{
switch (this.connection_state)
{
case CS_SERVER_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
{
skip13CertificateRequest();
// NB: Fall through to next case label
}
case CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
{
receive13ServerCertificate(buf);
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE;
break;
}
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
break;
}
case HandshakeType.certificate_request:
{
switch (this.connection_state)
{
case CS_END:
{
// TODO[tls13] Permit post-handshake authentication if we sent post_handshake_auth extension
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
case CS_SERVER_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
{
receive13CertificateRequest(buf, false);
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
break;
}
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
break;
}
case HandshakeType.certificate_verify:
{
switch (this.connection_state)
{
case CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
{
receive13ServerCertificateVerify(buf);
buf.updateHash(handshakeHash);
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
break;
}
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
break;
}
case HandshakeType.encrypted_extensions:
{
switch (this.connection_state)
{
case CS_SERVER_HELLO:
{
receive13EncryptedExtensions(buf);
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
break;
}
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
break;
}
case HandshakeType.finished:
{
switch (this.connection_state)
{
case CS_SERVER_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
{
skip13CertificateRequest();
// NB: Fall through to next case label
}
case CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
{
skip13ServerCertificate();
// NB: Fall through to next case label
}
case CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
{
receive13ServerFinished(buf);
buf.updateHash(handshakeHash);
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_FINISHED;
byte[] serverFinishedTranscriptHash = TlsUtils.getCurrentPRFHash(handshakeHash);
// See RFC 8446 D.4.
recordStream.setIgnoreChangeCipherSpec(false);
/*
* TODO[tls13] After receiving the server's Finished message, if the server has accepted early
* data, an EndOfEarlyData message will be sent to indicate the key change. This message will
* be encrypted with the 0-RTT traffic keys.
*/
if (null != certificateRequest)
{
TlsCredentialedSigner clientCredentials = TlsUtils.establish13ClientCredentials(authentication,
certificateRequest);
Certificate clientCertificate = null;
if (null != clientCredentials)
{
clientCertificate = clientCredentials.getCertificate();
}
if (null == clientCertificate)
{
// In this calling context, certificate_request_context is length 0
clientCertificate = Certificate.EMPTY_CHAIN_TLS13;
}
send13CertificateMessage(clientCertificate);
this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
if (null != clientCredentials)
{
DigitallySigned certificateVerify = TlsUtils.generate13CertificateVerify(tlsClientContext,
clientCredentials, handshakeHash);
send13CertificateVerifyMessage(certificateVerify);
this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
}
}
send13FinishedMessage();
this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_FINISHED;
TlsUtils.establish13PhaseApplication(tlsClientContext, serverFinishedTranscriptHash, recordStream);
recordStream.enablePendingCipherWrite();
recordStream.enablePendingCipherRead(false);
completeHandshake();
break;
}
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
break;
}
case HandshakeType.key_update:
{
receive13KeyUpdate(buf);
break;
}
case HandshakeType.new_session_ticket:
{
receive13NewSessionTicket(buf);
break;
}
case HandshakeType.server_hello:
{
switch (this.connection_state)
{
case CS_CLIENT_HELLO:
{
// NOTE: Legacy handler should be dispatching initial ServerHello/HelloRetryRequest.
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
case CS_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
{
ServerHello serverHello = receiveServerHelloMessage(buf);
if (serverHello.isHelloRetryRequest())
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
process13ServerHello(serverHello, true);
buf.updateHash(handshakeHash);
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_HELLO;
process13ServerHelloCoda(serverHello, true);
break;
}
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
break;
}
case HandshakeType.certificate_status:
case HandshakeType.certificate_url:
case HandshakeType.client_hello:
case HandshakeType.client_key_exchange:
case HandshakeType.compressed_certificate:
case HandshakeType.end_of_early_data:
case HandshakeType.hello_request:
case HandshakeType.hello_verify_request:
case HandshakeType.message_hash:
case HandshakeType.server_hello_done:
case HandshakeType.server_key_exchange:
case HandshakeType.supplemental_data:
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
}
protected void handleHandshakeMessage(short type, HandshakeMessageInput buf)
throws IOException
{
final SecurityParameters securityParameters = tlsClientContext.getSecurityParameters();
if (connection_state > CS_CLIENT_HELLO
&& TlsUtils.isTLSv13(securityParameters.getNegotiatedVersion()))
{
if (securityParameters.isResumedSession())
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
handle13HandshakeMessage(type, buf);
return;
}
if (!isLegacyConnectionState())
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
if (securityParameters.isResumedSession())
{
if (type != HandshakeType.finished || this.connection_state != CS_SERVER_HELLO)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
processFinishedMessage(buf);
buf.updateHash(handshakeHash);
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_FINISHED;
sendChangeCipherSpec();
sendFinishedMessage();
this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_FINISHED;
completeHandshake();
return;
}
switch (type)
{
case HandshakeType.certificate:
{
switch (this.connection_state)
{
case CS_SERVER_HELLO:
{
handleSupplementalData(null);
// NB: Fall through to next case label
}
case CS_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA:
{
/*
* NOTE: Certificate processing (including authentication) is delayed to allow for a
* possible CertificateStatus message.
*/
this.authentication = TlsUtils.receiveServerCertificate(tlsClientContext, tlsClient, buf, serverExtensions);
break;
}
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE;
break;
}
case HandshakeType.certificate_status:
{
switch (this.connection_state)
{
case CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
{
if (securityParameters.getStatusRequestVersion() < 1)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
this.certificateStatus = CertificateStatus.parse(tlsClientContext, buf);
assertEmpty(buf);
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
break;
}
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
break;
}
case HandshakeType.finished:
{
switch (this.connection_state)
{
case CS_CLIENT_FINISHED:
{
if (this.expectSessionTicket)
{
/*
* RFC 5077 3.3. This message MUST be sent if the server included a
* SessionTicket extension in the ServerHello.
*/
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
// NB: Fall through to next case label
}
case CS_SERVER_SESSION_TICKET:
{
processFinishedMessage(buf);
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_FINISHED;
completeHandshake();
break;
}
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
break;
}
case HandshakeType.server_hello:
{
switch (this.connection_state)
{
case CS_CLIENT_HELLO:
{
ServerHello serverHello = receiveServerHelloMessage(buf);
// TODO[tls13] Only treat as HRR if it's TLS 1.3??
if (serverHello.isHelloRetryRequest())
{
process13HelloRetryRequest(serverHello);
handshakeHash.notifyPRFDetermined();
handshakeHash.sealHashAlgorithms();
TlsUtils.adjustTranscriptForRetry(handshakeHash);
buf.updateHash(handshakeHash);
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
send13ClientHelloRetry();
this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY;
}
else
{
processServerHello(serverHello);
handshakeHash.notifyPRFDetermined();
if (TlsUtils.isTLSv13(securityParameters.getNegotiatedVersion()))
{
handshakeHash.sealHashAlgorithms();
}
buf.updateHash(handshakeHash);
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_HELLO;
if (TlsUtils.isTLSv13(securityParameters.getNegotiatedVersion()))
{
process13ServerHelloCoda(serverHello, false);
}
}
break;
}
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
break;
}
case HandshakeType.supplemental_data:
{
switch (this.connection_state)
{
case CS_SERVER_HELLO:
{
handleSupplementalData(readSupplementalDataMessage(buf));
break;
}
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
break;
}
case HandshakeType.server_hello_done:
{
switch (this.connection_state)
{
case CS_SERVER_HELLO:
{
handleSupplementalData(null);
// NB: Fall through to next case label
}
case CS_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA:
{
this.authentication = null;
// NB: Fall through to next case label
}
case CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
case CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE_STATUS:
{
handleServerCertificate();
// There was no server key exchange message; check it's OK
this.keyExchange.skipServerKeyExchange();
// NB: Fall through to next case label
}
case CS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
case CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
{
assertEmpty(buf);
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE;
TlsCredentials clientAuthCredentials = null;
TlsCredentialedSigner clientAuthSigner = null;
Certificate clientAuthCertificate = null;
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm clientAuthAlgorithm = null;
TlsStreamSigner clientAuthStreamSigner = null;
if (certificateRequest != null)
{
clientAuthCredentials = TlsUtils.establishClientCredentials(authentication, certificateRequest);
if (clientAuthCredentials != null)
{
clientAuthCertificate = clientAuthCredentials.getCertificate();
if (clientAuthCredentials instanceof TlsCredentialedSigner)
{
clientAuthSigner = (TlsCredentialedSigner)clientAuthCredentials;
clientAuthAlgorithm = TlsUtils.getSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(
securityParameters.getNegotiatedVersion(), clientAuthSigner);
clientAuthStreamSigner = clientAuthSigner.getStreamSigner();
if (ProtocolVersion.TLSv12.equals(securityParameters.getNegotiatedVersion()))
{
TlsUtils.verifySupportedSignatureAlgorithm(securityParameters.getServerSigAlgs(),
clientAuthAlgorithm, AlertDescription.internal_error);
if (clientAuthStreamSigner == null)
{
TlsUtils.trackHashAlgorithmClient(handshakeHash, clientAuthAlgorithm);
}
}
if (clientAuthStreamSigner != null)
{
handshakeHash.forceBuffering();
}
}
}
}
handshakeHash.sealHashAlgorithms();
if (clientAuthCredentials == null)
{
keyExchange.skipClientCredentials();
}
else
{
keyExchange.processClientCredentials(clientAuthCredentials);
}
Vector clientSupplementalData = tlsClient.getClientSupplementalData();
if (clientSupplementalData != null)
{
sendSupplementalDataMessage(clientSupplementalData);
this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
}
if (certificateRequest != null)
{
sendCertificateMessage(clientAuthCertificate, null);
this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
}
sendClientKeyExchange();
this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
final boolean isSSL = TlsUtils.isSSL(tlsClientContext);
if (isSSL)
{
// NOTE: For SSLv3 (only), master_secret needed to calculate session hash
establishMasterSecret(tlsClientContext, keyExchange);
}
securityParameters.sessionHash = TlsUtils.getCurrentPRFHash(handshakeHash);
if (!isSSL)
{
// NOTE: For (D)TLS, session hash potentially needed for extended_master_secret
establishMasterSecret(tlsClientContext, keyExchange);
}
recordStream.setPendingCipher(TlsUtils.initCipher(tlsClientContext));
if (clientAuthSigner != null)
{
DigitallySigned certificateVerify = TlsUtils.generateCertificateVerifyClient(tlsClientContext,
clientAuthSigner, clientAuthAlgorithm, clientAuthStreamSigner, handshakeHash);
sendCertificateVerifyMessage(certificateVerify);
this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
}
handshakeHash.stopTracking();
sendChangeCipherSpec();
sendFinishedMessage();
break;
}
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
this.connection_state = CS_CLIENT_FINISHED;
break;
}
case HandshakeType.server_key_exchange:
{
switch (this.connection_state)
{
case CS_SERVER_HELLO:
{
handleSupplementalData(null);
// NB: Fall through to next case label
}
case CS_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA:
{
this.authentication = null;
// NB: Fall through to next case label
}
case CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
case CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE_STATUS:
{
handleServerCertificate();
this.keyExchange.processServerKeyExchange(buf);
assertEmpty(buf);
break;
}
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
break;
}
case HandshakeType.certificate_request:
{
switch (this.connection_state)
{
case CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
case CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE_STATUS:
{
handleServerCertificate();
// There was no server key exchange message; check it's OK
this.keyExchange.skipServerKeyExchange();
// NB: Fall through to next case label
}
case CS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
{
receiveCertificateRequest(buf);
TlsUtils.establishServerSigAlgs(securityParameters, certificateRequest);
break;
}
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
break;
}
case HandshakeType.new_session_ticket:
{
switch (this.connection_state)
{
case CS_CLIENT_FINISHED:
{
if (!this.expectSessionTicket)
{
/*
* RFC 5077 3.3. This message MUST NOT be sent if the server did not include a
* SessionTicket extension in the ServerHello.
*/
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
/*
* RFC 5077 3.4. If the client receives a session ticket from the server, then it
* discards any Session ID that was sent in the ServerHello.
*/
securityParameters.sessionID = TlsUtils.EMPTY_BYTES;
invalidateSession();
this.tlsSession = TlsUtils.importSession(securityParameters.getSessionID(), null);
receiveNewSessionTicket(buf);
break;
}
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_SESSION_TICKET;
break;
}
case HandshakeType.hello_request:
{
assertEmpty(buf);
/*
* RFC 2246 7.4.1.1 Hello request This message will be ignored by the client if the
* client is currently negotiating a session. This message may be ignored by the client
* if it does not wish to renegotiate a session, or the client may, if it wishes,
* respond with a no_renegotiation alert.
*/
if (isApplicationDataReady())
{
handleRenegotiation();
}
break;
}
case HandshakeType.certificate_url:
case HandshakeType.certificate_verify:
case HandshakeType.client_hello:
case HandshakeType.client_key_exchange:
case HandshakeType.compressed_certificate:
case HandshakeType.encrypted_extensions:
case HandshakeType.end_of_early_data:
case HandshakeType.hello_verify_request:
case HandshakeType.key_update:
case HandshakeType.message_hash:
default:
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
}
protected void handleServerCertificate()
throws IOException
{
TlsUtils.processServerCertificate(tlsClientContext, certificateStatus, keyExchange, authentication,
clientExtensions, serverExtensions);
}
protected void handleSupplementalData(Vector serverSupplementalData)
throws IOException
{
tlsClient.processServerSupplementalData(serverSupplementalData);
this.connection_state = CS_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
this.keyExchange = TlsUtils.initKeyExchangeClient(tlsClientContext, tlsClient);
}
protected void process13HelloRetryRequest(ServerHello helloRetryRequest)
throws IOException
{
final ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version = ProtocolVersion.TLSv12;
recordStream.setWriteVersion(legacy_record_version);
final SecurityParameters securityParameters = tlsClientContext.getSecurityParametersHandshake();
if (securityParameters.isRenegotiating())
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
/*
* RFC 8446 4.1.4. Upon receipt of a HelloRetryRequest, the client MUST check the
* legacy_version, legacy_session_id_echo, cipher_suite, and legacy_compression_method as
* specified in Section 4.1.3 and then process the extensions, starting with determining the
* version using "supported_versions".
*/
final ProtocolVersion legacy_version = helloRetryRequest.getVersion();
final byte[] legacy_session_id_echo = helloRetryRequest.getSessionID();
final int cipherSuite = helloRetryRequest.getCipherSuite();
// NOTE: legacy_compression_method checked during ServerHello parsing
if (!ProtocolVersion.TLSv12.equals(legacy_version) ||
!Arrays.areEqual(clientHello.getSessionID(), legacy_session_id_echo) ||
!TlsUtils.isValidCipherSuiteSelection(clientHello.getCipherSuites(), cipherSuite))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
final Hashtable extensions = helloRetryRequest.getExtensions();
if (null == extensions)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
TlsUtils.checkExtensionData13(extensions, HandshakeType.hello_retry_request, AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
{
/*
* RFC 8446 4.2. Implementations MUST NOT send extension responses if the remote
* endpoint did not send the corresponding extension requests, with the exception of the
* "cookie" extension in the HelloRetryRequest. Upon receiving such an extension, an
* endpoint MUST abort the handshake with an "unsupported_extension" alert.
*/
Enumeration e = extensions.keys();
while (e.hasMoreElements())
{
Integer extType = (Integer)e.nextElement();
if (ExtensionType.cookie == extType.intValue())
{
continue;
}
if (null == TlsUtils.getExtensionData(clientExtensions, extType))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unsupported_extension);
}
}
}
final ProtocolVersion server_version = TlsExtensionsUtils.getSupportedVersionsExtensionServer(extensions);
if (null == server_version)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.missing_extension);
}
if (!ProtocolVersion.TLSv13.isEqualOrEarlierVersionOf(server_version) ||
!ProtocolVersion.contains(tlsClientContext.getClientSupportedVersions(), server_version) ||
!TlsUtils.isValidVersionForCipherSuite(cipherSuite, server_version))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
if (null != clientBinders)
{
if (!Arrays.contains(clientBinders.pskKeyExchangeModes, PskKeyExchangeMode.psk_dhe_ke))
{
this.clientBinders = null;
tlsClient.notifySelectedPSK(null);
}
}
/*
* RFC 8446 4.2.8. Upon receipt of this [Key Share] extension in a HelloRetryRequest, the
* client MUST verify that (1) the selected_group field corresponds to a group which was
* provided in the "supported_groups" extension in the original ClientHello and (2) the
* selected_group field does not correspond to a group which was provided in the "key_share"
* extension in the original ClientHello. If either of these checks fails, then the client
* MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.
*/
final int selected_group = TlsExtensionsUtils.getKeyShareHelloRetryRequest(extensions);
if (!TlsUtils.isValidKeyShareSelection(server_version, securityParameters.getClientSupportedGroups(),
clientAgreements, selected_group))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
final byte[] cookie = TlsExtensionsUtils.getCookieExtension(extensions);
securityParameters.negotiatedVersion = server_version;
TlsUtils.negotiatedVersionTLSClient(tlsClientContext, tlsClient);
securityParameters.resumedSession = false;
securityParameters.sessionID = TlsUtils.EMPTY_BYTES;
tlsClient.notifySessionID(TlsUtils.EMPTY_BYTES);
TlsUtils.negotiatedCipherSuite(securityParameters, cipherSuite);
tlsClient.notifySelectedCipherSuite(cipherSuite);
this.clientAgreements = null;
this.retryCookie = cookie;
this.retryGroup = selected_group;
}
protected void process13ServerHello(ServerHello serverHello, boolean afterHelloRetryRequest)
throws IOException
{
final SecurityParameters securityParameters = tlsClientContext.getSecurityParametersHandshake();
final ProtocolVersion legacy_version = serverHello.getVersion();
final byte[] legacy_session_id_echo = serverHello.getSessionID();
final int cipherSuite = serverHello.getCipherSuite();
// NOTE: legacy_compression_method checked during ServerHello parsing
if (!ProtocolVersion.TLSv12.equals(legacy_version) ||
!Arrays.areEqual(clientHello.getSessionID(), legacy_session_id_echo))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
final Hashtable extensions = serverHello.getExtensions();
if (null == extensions)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
TlsUtils.checkExtensionData13(extensions, HandshakeType.server_hello, AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
if (afterHelloRetryRequest)
{
final ProtocolVersion server_version = TlsExtensionsUtils.getSupportedVersionsExtensionServer(extensions);
if (null == server_version)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.missing_extension);
}
if (!securityParameters.getNegotiatedVersion().equals(server_version) ||
securityParameters.getCipherSuite() != cipherSuite)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
}
else
{
if (!TlsUtils.isValidCipherSuiteSelection(clientHello.getCipherSuites(), cipherSuite) ||
!TlsUtils.isValidVersionForCipherSuite(cipherSuite, securityParameters.getNegotiatedVersion()))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
securityParameters.resumedSession = false;
securityParameters.sessionID = TlsUtils.EMPTY_BYTES;
tlsClient.notifySessionID(TlsUtils.EMPTY_BYTES);
TlsUtils.negotiatedCipherSuite(securityParameters, cipherSuite);
tlsClient.notifySelectedCipherSuite(cipherSuite);
}
this.clientHello = null;
// NOTE: Apparently downgrade marker mechanism not used for TLS 1.3+?
securityParameters.serverRandom = serverHello.getRandom();
securityParameters.secureRenegotiation = false;
/*
* RFC 8446 Appendix D. Because TLS 1.3 always hashes in the transcript up to the server
* Finished, implementations which support both TLS 1.3 and earlier versions SHOULD indicate
* the use of the Extended Master Secret extension in their APIs whenever TLS 1.3 is used.
*/
securityParameters.extendedMasterSecret = true;
/*
* TODO[tls13] RFC 8446 4.4.2.1. OCSP Status and SCT Extensions.
*
* OCSP information is carried in an extension for a CertificateEntry.
*/
securityParameters.statusRequestVersion = clientExtensions.containsKey(TlsExtensionsUtils.EXT_status_request) ? 1 : 0;
TlsSecret pskEarlySecret = null;
{
int selected_identity = TlsExtensionsUtils.getPreSharedKeyServerHello(extensions);
TlsPSK selectedPSK = null;
if (selected_identity >= 0)
{
if (null == clientBinders || selected_identity >= clientBinders.psks.length)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
selectedPSK = clientBinders.psks[selected_identity];
if (selectedPSK.getPRFAlgorithm() != securityParameters.getPRFAlgorithm())
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
pskEarlySecret = clientBinders.earlySecrets[selected_identity];
this.selectedPSK13 = true;
}
tlsClient.notifySelectedPSK(selectedPSK);
}
TlsSecret sharedSecret = null;
{
KeyShareEntry keyShareEntry = TlsExtensionsUtils.getKeyShareServerHello(extensions);
if (null == keyShareEntry)
{
if (afterHelloRetryRequest
|| null == pskEarlySecret
|| !Arrays.contains(clientBinders.pskKeyExchangeModes, PskKeyExchangeMode.psk_ke))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
}
else
{
if (null != pskEarlySecret
&& !Arrays.contains(clientBinders.pskKeyExchangeModes, PskKeyExchangeMode.psk_dhe_ke))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
int namedGroup = keyShareEntry.getNamedGroup();
TlsAgreement agreement = (TlsAgreement)clientAgreements.get(Integers.valueOf(namedGroup));
if (null == agreement)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
agreement.receivePeerValue(keyShareEntry.getKeyExchange());
sharedSecret = agreement.calculateSecret();
}
}
this.clientAgreements = null;
this.clientBinders = null;
TlsUtils.establish13PhaseSecrets(tlsClientContext, pskEarlySecret, sharedSecret);
invalidateSession();
this.tlsSession = TlsUtils.importSession(securityParameters.getSessionID(), null);
}
protected void process13ServerHelloCoda(ServerHello serverHello, boolean afterHelloRetryRequest) throws IOException
{
byte[] serverHelloTranscriptHash = TlsUtils.getCurrentPRFHash(handshakeHash);
TlsUtils.establish13PhaseHandshake(tlsClientContext, serverHelloTranscriptHash, recordStream);
// See RFC 8446 D.4.
if (!afterHelloRetryRequest)
{
recordStream.setIgnoreChangeCipherSpec(true);
/*
* TODO[tls13] If offering early_data, the record is placed immediately after the first
* ClientHello.
*/
/*
* TODO[tls13] Ideally wait until just after Server Finished received, but then we'd need to defer
* the enabling of the pending write cipher
*/
sendChangeCipherSpecMessage();
}
recordStream.enablePendingCipherWrite();
recordStream.enablePendingCipherRead(false);
}
protected void processServerHello(ServerHello serverHello)
throws IOException
{
Hashtable serverHelloExtensions = serverHello.getExtensions();
final ProtocolVersion legacy_version = serverHello.getVersion();
final ProtocolVersion supported_version = TlsExtensionsUtils
.getSupportedVersionsExtensionServer(serverHelloExtensions);
final ProtocolVersion server_version;
if (null == supported_version)
{
server_version = legacy_version;
}
else
{
if (!ProtocolVersion.TLSv12.equals(legacy_version) ||
!ProtocolVersion.TLSv13.isEqualOrEarlierVersionOf(supported_version))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
server_version = supported_version;
}
final SecurityParameters securityParameters = tlsClientContext.getSecurityParametersHandshake();
if (securityParameters.isRenegotiating())
{
// Check that this matches the negotiated version from the initial handshake
if (!server_version.equals(securityParameters.getNegotiatedVersion()))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
}
else
{
if (!ProtocolVersion.contains(tlsClientContext.getClientSupportedVersions(), server_version))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.protocol_version);
}
ProtocolVersion legacy_record_version = server_version.isLaterVersionOf(ProtocolVersion.TLSv12)
? ProtocolVersion.TLSv12
: server_version;
this.recordStream.setWriteVersion(legacy_record_version);
securityParameters.negotiatedVersion = server_version;
}
TlsUtils.negotiatedVersionTLSClient(tlsClientContext, tlsClient);
if (ProtocolVersion.TLSv13.isEqualOrEarlierVersionOf(server_version))
{
process13ServerHello(serverHello, false);
return;
}
int[] offeredCipherSuites = clientHello.getCipherSuites();
this.clientHello = null;
this.retryCookie = null;
this.retryGroup = -1;
securityParameters.serverRandom = serverHello.getRandom();
if (!tlsClientContext.getClientVersion().equals(server_version))
{
TlsUtils.checkDowngradeMarker(server_version, securityParameters.getServerRandom());
}
{
byte[] selectedSessionID = serverHello.getSessionID();
securityParameters.sessionID = selectedSessionID;
tlsClient.notifySessionID(selectedSessionID);
securityParameters.resumedSession = selectedSessionID.length > 0 && this.tlsSession != null
&& Arrays.areEqual(selectedSessionID, this.tlsSession.getSessionID());
}
/*
* Find out which CipherSuite the server has chosen and check that it was one of the offered
* ones, and is a valid selection for the negotiated version.
*/
{
int cipherSuite = serverHello.getCipherSuite();
if (!TlsUtils.isValidCipherSuiteSelection(offeredCipherSuites, cipherSuite) ||
!TlsUtils.isValidVersionForCipherSuite(cipherSuite, securityParameters.getNegotiatedVersion()))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
TlsUtils.negotiatedCipherSuite(securityParameters, cipherSuite);
tlsClient.notifySelectedCipherSuite(cipherSuite);
}
/*
* RFC 3546 2.2 Note that the extended server hello message is only sent in response to an
* extended client hello message.
*
* However, see RFC 5746 exception below. We always include the SCSV, so an Extended Server
* Hello is always allowed.
*/
this.serverExtensions = serverHelloExtensions;
if (this.serverExtensions != null)
{
Enumeration e = this.serverExtensions.keys();
while (e.hasMoreElements())
{
Integer extType = (Integer)e.nextElement();
/*
* RFC 5746 3.6. Note that sending a "renegotiation_info" extension in response to a
* ClientHello containing only the SCSV is an explicit exception to the prohibition
* in RFC 5246, Section 7.4.1.4, on the server sending unsolicited extensions and is
* only allowed because the client is signaling its willingness to receive the
* extension via the TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV SCSV.
*/
if (extType.equals(EXT_RenegotiationInfo))
{
continue;
}
/*
* RFC 5246 7.4.1.4 An extension type MUST NOT appear in the ServerHello unless the
* same extension type appeared in the corresponding ClientHello. If a client
* receives an extension type in ServerHello that it did not request in the
* associated ClientHello, it MUST abort the handshake with an unsupported_extension
* fatal alert.
*/
if (null == TlsUtils.getExtensionData(this.clientExtensions, extType))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unsupported_extension);
}
/*
* RFC 3546 2.3. If [...] the older session is resumed, then the server MUST ignore
* extensions appearing in the client hello, and send a server hello containing no
* extensions[.]
*/
if (securityParameters.isResumedSession())
{
// TODO[compat-gnutls] GnuTLS test server sends server extensions e.g. ec_point_formats
// TODO[compat-openssl] OpenSSL test server sends server extensions e.g. ec_point_formats
// TODO[compat-polarssl] PolarSSL test server sends server extensions e.g. ec_point_formats
// throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
}
}
byte[] renegExtData = TlsUtils.getExtensionData(this.serverExtensions, EXT_RenegotiationInfo);
if (securityParameters.isRenegotiating())
{
/*
* RFC 5746 3.5. Client Behavior: Secure Renegotiation
*
* This text applies if the connection's "secure_renegotiation" flag is set to TRUE.
*/
if (!securityParameters.isSecureRenegotiation())
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
/*
* When a ServerHello is received, the client MUST verify that the "renegotiation_info"
* extension is present; if it is not, the client MUST abort the handshake.
*/
if (renegExtData == null)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.handshake_failure);
}
/*
* The client MUST then verify that the first half of the "renegotiated_connection"
* field is equal to the saved client_verify_data value, and the second half is equal to
* the saved server_verify_data value. If they are not, the client MUST abort the
* handshake.
*/
SecurityParameters saved = tlsClientContext.getSecurityParametersConnection();
byte[] reneg_conn_info = TlsUtils.concat(saved.getLocalVerifyData(), saved.getPeerVerifyData());
if (!Arrays.constantTimeAreEqual(renegExtData, createRenegotiationInfo(reneg_conn_info)))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.handshake_failure);
}
}
else
{
/*
* RFC 5746 3.4. Client Behavior: Initial Handshake (both full and session-resumption)
*/
/*
* When a ServerHello is received, the client MUST check if it includes the
* "renegotiation_info" extension:
*/
if (renegExtData == null)
{
/*
* If the extension is not present, the server does not support secure
* renegotiation; set secure_renegotiation flag to FALSE. In this case, some clients
* may want to terminate the handshake instead of continuing; see Section 4.1 for
* discussion.
*/
securityParameters.secureRenegotiation = false;
}
else
{
/*
* If the extension is present, set the secure_renegotiation flag to TRUE. The
* client MUST then verify that the length of the "renegotiated_connection"
* field is zero, and if it is not, MUST abort the handshake (by sending a fatal
* handshake_failure alert).
*/
securityParameters.secureRenegotiation = true;
if (!Arrays.constantTimeAreEqual(renegExtData, createRenegotiationInfo(TlsUtils.EMPTY_BYTES)))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.handshake_failure);
}
}
}
// TODO[compat-gnutls] GnuTLS test server fails to send renegotiation_info extension when resuming
tlsClient.notifySecureRenegotiation(securityParameters.isSecureRenegotiation());
/*
* RFC 7627 4. Clients and servers SHOULD NOT accept handshakes that do not use the extended
* master secret [..]. (and see 5.2, 5.3)
*
* RFC 8446 Appendix D. Because TLS 1.3 always hashes in the transcript up to the server
* Finished, implementations which support both TLS 1.3 and earlier versions SHOULD indicate
* the use of the Extended Master Secret extension in their APIs whenever TLS 1.3 is used.
*/
{
final boolean acceptedExtendedMasterSecret = TlsExtensionsUtils.hasExtendedMasterSecretExtension(
serverExtensions);
final boolean resumedSession = securityParameters.isResumedSession();
if (acceptedExtendedMasterSecret)
{
if (server_version.isSSL()
|| (!resumedSession && !tlsClient.shouldUseExtendedMasterSecret()))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.handshake_failure);
}
}
else
{
if (tlsClient.requiresExtendedMasterSecret()
|| (resumedSession && !tlsClient.allowLegacyResumption()))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.handshake_failure);
}
}
securityParameters.extendedMasterSecret = acceptedExtendedMasterSecret;
}
/*
* RFC 7301 3.1. When session resumption or session tickets [...] are used, the previous
* contents of this extension are irrelevant, and only the values in the new handshake
* messages are considered.
*/
securityParameters.applicationProtocol = TlsExtensionsUtils.getALPNExtensionServer(serverExtensions);
securityParameters.applicationProtocolSet = true;
Hashtable sessionClientExtensions = clientExtensions, sessionServerExtensions = serverExtensions;
if (securityParameters.isResumedSession())
{
if (securityParameters.getCipherSuite() != this.sessionParameters.getCipherSuite()
|| CompressionMethod._null != this.sessionParameters.getCompressionAlgorithm()
|| !server_version.equals(this.sessionParameters.getNegotiatedVersion()))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
sessionClientExtensions = null;
sessionServerExtensions = this.sessionParameters.readServerExtensions();
}
if (sessionServerExtensions != null && !sessionServerExtensions.isEmpty())
{
{
/*
* RFC 7366 3. If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension from a client
* and then selects a stream or Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)
* ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the
* client.
*/
boolean serverSentEncryptThenMAC = TlsExtensionsUtils.hasEncryptThenMACExtension(sessionServerExtensions);
if (serverSentEncryptThenMAC && !TlsUtils.isBlockCipherSuite(securityParameters.getCipherSuite()))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
securityParameters.encryptThenMAC = serverSentEncryptThenMAC;
}
securityParameters.maxFragmentLength = processMaxFragmentLengthExtension(sessionClientExtensions,
sessionServerExtensions, AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
securityParameters.truncatedHMac = TlsExtensionsUtils.hasTruncatedHMacExtension(sessionServerExtensions);
/*
* TODO It's surprising that there's no provision to allow a 'fresh' CertificateStatus to be sent in
* a session resumption handshake.
*/
if (!securityParameters.isResumedSession())
{
// TODO[tls13] See RFC 8446 4.4.2.1
if (TlsUtils.hasExpectedEmptyExtensionData(sessionServerExtensions, TlsExtensionsUtils.EXT_status_request_v2,
AlertDescription.illegal_parameter))
{
securityParameters.statusRequestVersion = 2;
}
else if (TlsUtils.hasExpectedEmptyExtensionData(sessionServerExtensions, TlsExtensionsUtils.EXT_status_request,
AlertDescription.illegal_parameter))
{
securityParameters.statusRequestVersion = 1;
}
this.expectSessionTicket = TlsUtils.hasExpectedEmptyExtensionData(sessionServerExtensions,
TlsProtocol.EXT_SessionTicket, AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
}
if (sessionClientExtensions != null)
{
tlsClient.processServerExtensions(sessionServerExtensions);
}
applyMaxFragmentLengthExtension(securityParameters.getMaxFragmentLength());
if (securityParameters.isResumedSession())
{
securityParameters.masterSecret = sessionMasterSecret;
this.recordStream.setPendingCipher(TlsUtils.initCipher(tlsClientContext));
}
else
{
invalidateSession();
this.tlsSession = TlsUtils.importSession(securityParameters.getSessionID(), null);
}
}
protected void receive13CertificateRequest(ByteArrayInputStream buf, boolean postHandshakeAuth)
throws IOException
{
// TODO[tls13] Support for post_handshake_auth
if (postHandshakeAuth)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
/*
* RFC 8446 4.3.2. A server which is authenticating with a certificate MAY optionally
* request a certificate from the client.
*/
if (selectedPSK13)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
CertificateRequest certificateRequest = CertificateRequest.parse(tlsClientContext, buf);
assertEmpty(buf);
if (!certificateRequest.hasCertificateRequestContext(TlsUtils.EMPTY_BYTES))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
this.certificateRequest = certificateRequest;
tlsClientContext.getSecurityParametersHandshake().clientCertificateType =
TlsExtensionsUtils.getClientCertificateTypeExtensionServer(serverExtensions, CertificateType.X509);
TlsUtils.establishServerSigAlgs(tlsClientContext.getSecurityParametersHandshake(), certificateRequest);
}
protected void receive13EncryptedExtensions(ByteArrayInputStream buf)
throws IOException
{
byte[] extBytes = TlsUtils.readOpaque16(buf);
assertEmpty(buf);
this.serverExtensions = readExtensionsData13(HandshakeType.encrypted_extensions, extBytes);
{
/*
* RFC 8446 4.2. Implementations MUST NOT send extension responses if the remote
* endpoint did not send the corresponding extension requests, with the exception of the
* "cookie" extension in the HelloRetryRequest. Upon receiving such an extension, an
* endpoint MUST abort the handshake with an "unsupported_extension" alert.
*/
Enumeration e = serverExtensions.keys();
while (e.hasMoreElements())
{
Integer extType = (Integer)e.nextElement();
if (null == TlsUtils.getExtensionData(clientExtensions, extType))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unsupported_extension);
}
}
}
final SecurityParameters securityParameters = tlsClientContext.getSecurityParametersHandshake();
final ProtocolVersion negotiatedVersion = securityParameters.getNegotiatedVersion();
securityParameters.applicationProtocol = TlsExtensionsUtils.getALPNExtensionServer(serverExtensions);
securityParameters.applicationProtocolSet = true;
Hashtable sessionClientExtensions = clientExtensions, sessionServerExtensions = serverExtensions;
if (securityParameters.isResumedSession())
{
if (securityParameters.getCipherSuite() != sessionParameters.getCipherSuite()
|| CompressionMethod._null != sessionParameters.getCompressionAlgorithm()
|| !negotiatedVersion.equals(sessionParameters.getNegotiatedVersion()))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
}
sessionClientExtensions = null;
sessionServerExtensions = sessionParameters.readServerExtensions();
}
securityParameters.maxFragmentLength = processMaxFragmentLengthExtension(sessionClientExtensions,
sessionServerExtensions, AlertDescription.illegal_parameter);
securityParameters.encryptThenMAC = false;
securityParameters.truncatedHMac = false;
/*
* TODO[tls13] RFC 8446 4.4.2.1. OCSP Status and SCT Extensions.
*
* OCSP information is carried in an extension for a CertificateEntry.
*/
securityParameters.statusRequestVersion = clientExtensions.containsKey(TlsExtensionsUtils.EXT_status_request)
? 1 : 0;
this.expectSessionTicket = false;
if (null != sessionClientExtensions)
{
tlsClient.processServerExtensions(serverExtensions);
}
applyMaxFragmentLengthExtension(securityParameters.getMaxFragmentLength());
}
protected void receive13NewSessionTicket(ByteArrayInputStream buf)
throws IOException
{
if (!isApplicationDataReady())
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
// TODO[tls13] Do something more than just ignore them
// struct {
// uint32 ticket_lifetime;
// uint32 ticket_age_add;
// opaque ticket_nonce<0..255>;
// opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>;
// Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>;
// } NewSessionTicket;
TlsUtils.readUint32(buf);
TlsUtils.readUint32(buf);
TlsUtils.readOpaque8(buf);
TlsUtils.readOpaque16(buf);
TlsUtils.readOpaque16(buf);
assertEmpty(buf);
}
protected void receive13ServerCertificate(ByteArrayInputStream buf)
throws IOException
{
if (selectedPSK13)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
this.authentication = TlsUtils.receive13ServerCertificate(tlsClientContext, tlsClient, buf, serverExtensions);
// NOTE: In TLS 1.3 we don't have to wait for a possible CertificateStatus message.
handleServerCertificate();
}
protected void receive13ServerCertificateVerify(ByteArrayInputStream buf)
throws IOException
{
Certificate serverCertificate = tlsClientContext.getSecurityParametersHandshake().getPeerCertificate();
if (null == serverCertificate || serverCertificate.isEmpty())
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
CertificateVerify certificateVerify = CertificateVerify.parse(tlsClientContext, buf);
assertEmpty(buf);
TlsUtils.verify13CertificateVerifyServer(tlsClientContext, handshakeHash, certificateVerify);
}
protected void receive13ServerFinished(ByteArrayInputStream buf)
throws IOException
{
process13FinishedMessage(buf);
}
protected void receiveCertificateRequest(ByteArrayInputStream buf) throws IOException
{
if (null == authentication)
{
/*
* RFC 2246 7.4.4. It is a fatal handshake_failure alert for an anonymous server to
* request client identification.
*/
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.handshake_failure);
}
CertificateRequest certificateRequest = CertificateRequest.parse(tlsClientContext, buf);
assertEmpty(buf);
this.certificateRequest = TlsUtils.validateCertificateRequest(certificateRequest, keyExchange);
tlsClientContext.getSecurityParametersHandshake().clientCertificateType =
TlsExtensionsUtils.getClientCertificateTypeExtensionServer(serverExtensions, CertificateType.X509);
}
protected void receiveNewSessionTicket(ByteArrayInputStream buf)
throws IOException
{
NewSessionTicket newSessionTicket = NewSessionTicket.parse(buf);
assertEmpty(buf);
tlsClient.notifyNewSessionTicket(newSessionTicket);
}
protected ServerHello receiveServerHelloMessage(ByteArrayInputStream buf)
throws IOException
{
return ServerHello.parse(buf);
}
protected void send13ClientHelloRetry() throws IOException
{
Hashtable clientHelloExtensions = clientHello.getExtensions();
clientHelloExtensions.remove(TlsExtensionsUtils.EXT_cookie);
clientHelloExtensions.remove(TlsExtensionsUtils.EXT_early_data);
clientHelloExtensions.remove(TlsExtensionsUtils.EXT_key_share);
clientHelloExtensions.remove(TlsExtensionsUtils.EXT_pre_shared_key);
/*
* RFC 4.2.2. When sending the new ClientHello, the client MUST copy the contents of the
* extension received in the HelloRetryRequest into a "cookie" extension in the new
* ClientHello.
*/
if (null != retryCookie)
{
/*
* - Including a "cookie" extension if one was provided in the HelloRetryRequest.
*/
TlsExtensionsUtils.addCookieExtension(clientHelloExtensions, retryCookie);
this.retryCookie = null;
}
/*
* - Updating the "pre_shared_key" extension if present by recomputing the "obfuscated_ticket_age"
* and binder values and (optionally) removing any PSKs which are incompatible with the server's
* indicated cipher suite.
*/
if (null != clientBinders)
{
this.clientBinders = TlsUtils.addPreSharedKeyToClientHelloRetry(tlsClientContext, clientBinders,
clientHelloExtensions);
if (null == clientBinders)
{
tlsClient.notifySelectedPSK(null);
}
}
/*
* RFC 8446 4.2.8. [..] when sending the new ClientHello, the client MUST replace the
* original "key_share" extension with one containing only a new KeyShareEntry for the group
* indicated in the selected_group field of the triggering HelloRetryRequest.
*/
if (retryGroup < 0)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
/*
* - If a "key_share" extension was supplied in the HelloRetryRequest, replacing the list of shares
* with a list containing a single KeyShareEntry from the indicated group
*/
this.clientAgreements = TlsUtils.addKeyShareToClientHelloRetry(tlsClientContext, clientHelloExtensions,
retryGroup);
/*
* TODO[tls13] Optionally adding, removing, or changing the length of the "padding"
* extension [RFC7685].
*/
// See RFC 8446 D.4.
{
recordStream.setIgnoreChangeCipherSpec(true);
/*
* TODO[tls13] If offering early_data, the record is placed immediately after the first
* ClientHello.
*/
sendChangeCipherSpecMessage();
}
sendClientHelloMessage();
}
protected void sendCertificateVerifyMessage(DigitallySigned certificateVerify)
throws IOException
{
HandshakeMessageOutput message = new HandshakeMessageOutput(HandshakeType.certificate_verify);
certificateVerify.encode(message);
message.send(this);
}
protected void sendClientHello()
throws IOException
{
SecurityParameters securityParameters = tlsClientContext.getSecurityParametersHandshake();
ProtocolVersion[] supportedVersions;
ProtocolVersion earliestVersion, latestVersion;
if (securityParameters.isRenegotiating())
{
ProtocolVersion clientVersion = tlsClientContext.getClientVersion();
supportedVersions = clientVersion.only();
earliestVersion = clientVersion;
latestVersion = clientVersion;
}
else
{
supportedVersions = tlsClient.getProtocolVersions();
if (ProtocolVersion.contains(supportedVersions, ProtocolVersion.SSLv3))
{
// TODO[tls13] Prevent offering SSLv3 AND TLSv13?
recordStream.setWriteVersion(ProtocolVersion.SSLv3);
}
else
{
recordStream.setWriteVersion(ProtocolVersion.TLSv10);
}
earliestVersion = ProtocolVersion.getEarliestTLS(supportedVersions);
latestVersion = ProtocolVersion.getLatestTLS(supportedVersions);
if (!ProtocolVersion.isSupportedTLSVersionClient(latestVersion))
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
tlsClientContext.setClientVersion(latestVersion);
}
tlsClientContext.setClientSupportedVersions(supportedVersions);
final boolean offeringTLSv12Minus = ProtocolVersion.TLSv12.isEqualOrLaterVersionOf(earliestVersion);
final boolean offeringTLSv13Plus = ProtocolVersion.TLSv13.isEqualOrEarlierVersionOf(latestVersion);
{
boolean useGMTUnixTime = !offeringTLSv13Plus && tlsClient.shouldUseGMTUnixTime();
securityParameters.clientRandom = createRandomBlock(useGMTUnixTime, tlsClientContext);
}
establishSession(offeringTLSv12Minus ? tlsClient.getSessionToResume() : null);
tlsClient.notifySessionToResume(tlsSession);
/*
* TODO RFC 5077 3.4. When presenting a ticket, the client MAY generate and include a
* Session ID in the TLS ClientHello.
*/
byte[] legacy_session_id = TlsUtils.getSessionID(tlsSession);
boolean fallback = tlsClient.isFallback();
int[] offeredCipherSuites = tlsClient.getCipherSuites();
if (legacy_session_id.length > 0 && this.sessionParameters != null)
{
if (!Arrays.contains(offeredCipherSuites, sessionParameters.getCipherSuite())
|| CompressionMethod._null != sessionParameters.getCompressionAlgorithm())
{
legacy_session_id = TlsUtils.EMPTY_BYTES;
}
}
this.clientExtensions = TlsExtensionsUtils.ensureExtensionsInitialised(tlsClient.getClientExtensions());
ProtocolVersion legacy_version = latestVersion;
if (offeringTLSv13Plus)
{
legacy_version = ProtocolVersion.TLSv12;
TlsExtensionsUtils.addSupportedVersionsExtensionClient(clientExtensions, supportedVersions);
/*
* RFC 8446 4.2.1. In compatibility mode [..], this field MUST be non-empty, so a client
* not offering a pre-TLS 1.3 session MUST generate a new 32-byte value.
*/
if (legacy_session_id.length < 1)
{
legacy_session_id = tlsClientContext.getNonceGenerator().generateNonce(32);
}
}
tlsClientContext.setRSAPreMasterSecretVersion(legacy_version);
securityParameters.clientServerNames = TlsExtensionsUtils.getServerNameExtensionClient(clientExtensions);
if (TlsUtils.isSignatureAlgorithmsExtensionAllowed(latestVersion))
{
TlsUtils.establishClientSigAlgs(securityParameters, clientExtensions);
}
securityParameters.clientSupportedGroups = TlsExtensionsUtils.getSupportedGroupsExtension(clientExtensions);
this.clientBinders = TlsUtils.addPreSharedKeyToClientHello(tlsClientContext, tlsClient, clientExtensions,
offeredCipherSuites);
// TODO[tls13-psk] Perhaps don't add key_share if external PSK(s) offered and 'psk_dhe_ke' not offered
this.clientAgreements = TlsUtils.addKeyShareToClientHello(tlsClientContext, tlsClient, clientExtensions);
if (TlsUtils.isExtendedMasterSecretOptionalTLS(supportedVersions)
&& (tlsClient.shouldUseExtendedMasterSecret() ||
(null != sessionParameters && sessionParameters.isExtendedMasterSecret())))
{
TlsExtensionsUtils.addExtendedMasterSecretExtension(this.clientExtensions);
}
else if (!offeringTLSv13Plus && tlsClient.requiresExtendedMasterSecret())
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
if (securityParameters.isRenegotiating())
{
/*
* RFC 5746 3.5. Client Behavior: Secure Renegotiation
*
* This text applies if the connection's "secure_renegotiation" flag is set to TRUE.
*/
if (!securityParameters.isSecureRenegotiation())
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.internal_error);
}
/*
* The client MUST include the "renegotiation_info" extension in the ClientHello,
* containing the saved client_verify_data. The SCSV MUST NOT be included.
*/
SecurityParameters saved = tlsClientContext.getSecurityParametersConnection();
this.clientExtensions.put(EXT_RenegotiationInfo, createRenegotiationInfo(saved.getLocalVerifyData()));
}
else
{
/*
* RFC 5746 3.4. Client Behavior: Initial Handshake (both full and session-resumption)
*/
/*
* The client MUST include either an empty "renegotiation_info" extension, or the
* TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV signaling cipher suite value in the ClientHello.
* Including both is NOT RECOMMENDED.
*/
boolean noRenegExt = (null == TlsUtils.getExtensionData(clientExtensions, EXT_RenegotiationInfo));
boolean noRenegSCSV = !Arrays.contains(offeredCipherSuites, CipherSuite.TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV);
if (noRenegExt && noRenegSCSV)
{
// TODO[tls13] Probably want to not add this if no pre-TLSv13 versions offered?
offeredCipherSuites = Arrays.append(offeredCipherSuites, CipherSuite.TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV);
}
}
/*
* (Fallback SCSV)
* RFC 7507 4. If a client sends a ClientHello.client_version containing a lower value
* than the latest (highest-valued) version supported by the client, it SHOULD include
* the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV cipher suite value in ClientHello.cipher_suites [..]. (The
* client SHOULD put TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV after all cipher suites that it actually intends
* to negotiate.)
*/
if (fallback && !Arrays.contains(offeredCipherSuites, CipherSuite.TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV))
{
offeredCipherSuites = Arrays.append(offeredCipherSuites, CipherSuite.TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV);
}
int bindersSize = null == clientBinders ? 0 : clientBinders.bindersSize;
this.clientHello = new ClientHello(legacy_version, securityParameters.getClientRandom(), legacy_session_id,
null, offeredCipherSuites, clientExtensions, bindersSize);
sendClientHelloMessage();
}
protected void sendClientHelloMessage() throws IOException
{
HandshakeMessageOutput message = new HandshakeMessageOutput(HandshakeType.client_hello);
clientHello.encode(tlsClientContext, message);
message.prepareClientHello(handshakeHash, clientHello.getBindersSize());
if (null != clientBinders)
{
OfferedPsks.encodeBinders(message, tlsClientContext.getCrypto(), handshakeHash, clientBinders);
}
message.sendClientHello(this, handshakeHash, clientHello.getBindersSize());
}
protected void sendClientKeyExchange()
throws IOException
{
HandshakeMessageOutput message = new HandshakeMessageOutput(HandshakeType.client_key_exchange);
this.keyExchange.generateClientKeyExchange(message);
message.send(this);
}
protected void skip13CertificateRequest()
throws IOException
{
this.certificateRequest = null;
}
protected void skip13ServerCertificate()
throws IOException
{
if (!selectedPSK13)
{
throw new TlsFatalAlert(AlertDescription.unexpected_message);
}
this.authentication = TlsUtils.skip13ServerCertificate(tlsClientContext);
}
}
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