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package org.ldk.structs;
import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
import org.ldk.enums.*;
import org.ldk.util.*;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.lang.ref.Reference;
import javax.annotation.Nullable;
/**
* Options which apply on a per-channel basis and may change at runtime or based on negotiation
* with our counterparty.
*/
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
public class ChannelConfig extends CommonBase {
ChannelConfig(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); }
@Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
super.finalize();
if (ptr != 0) { bindings.ChannelConfig_free(ptr); }
}
/**
* Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) charged per satoshi for payments forwarded outbound
* over the channel.
* This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
* update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
*
* Default value: 0.
*/
public int get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths() {
int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) charged per satoshi for payments forwarded outbound
* over the channel.
* This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
* update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
*
* Default value: 0.
*/
public void set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(int val) {
bindings.ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* Amount (in milli-satoshi) charged for payments forwarded outbound over the channel, in
* excess of [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`].
* This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
* update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
*
* The default value of a single satoshi roughly matches the market rate on many routing nodes
* as of July 2021. Adjusting it upwards or downwards may change whether nodes route through
* this node.
*
* Default value: 1000.
*
* [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
*/
public int get_forwarding_fee_base_msat() {
int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* Amount (in milli-satoshi) charged for payments forwarded outbound over the channel, in
* excess of [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`].
* This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
* update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
*
* The default value of a single satoshi roughly matches the market rate on many routing nodes
* as of July 2021. Adjusting it upwards or downwards may change whether nodes route through
* this node.
*
* Default value: 1000.
*
* [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
*/
public void set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(int val) {
bindings.ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
* the channel this config applies to.
*
* This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight
* HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas
* [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining
* (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance.
*
* Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed,
* we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current
* commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us
* enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
* the spending transaction).
*
* Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
* Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
* [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
*
* [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
*/
public short get_cltv_expiry_delta() {
short ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
* the channel this config applies to.
*
* This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight
* HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas
* [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining
* (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance.
*
* Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed,
* we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current
* commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us
* enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
* the spending transaction).
*
* Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
* Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
* [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
*
* [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
*/
public void set_cltv_expiry_delta(short val) {
bindings.ChannelConfig_set_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
* small to claim on-chain.
*
* When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will
* not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either
* party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure
* to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
* channel is force-closed.
*
* The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
* channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
* a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
* (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
* account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this
* value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier
* variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels.
*
* The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
* exposure across all three types per-channel.
*
* Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 5000.
*/
public MaxDustHTLCExposure get_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure ret_hu_conv = org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
* small to claim on-chain.
*
* When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will
* not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either
* party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure
* to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
* channel is force-closed.
*
* The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
* channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
* a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
* (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
* account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this
* value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier
* variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels.
*
* The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
* exposure across all three types per-channel.
*
* Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 5000.
*/
public void set_max_dust_htlc_exposure(org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure val) {
bindings.ChannelConfig_set_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this.ptr, val.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(val); };
}
/**
* The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
* `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
*
* When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the
* closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel
* funder/initiator.
*
* When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
* acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
* this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
* [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
* willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
* funds.
*
* When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
* [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
* Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
*
* Default value: 1000 satoshis.
*
* [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
* [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
*/
public long get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
* `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
*
* When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the
* closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel
* funder/initiator.
*
* When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
* acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
* this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
* [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
* willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
* funds.
*
* When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
* [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
* Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
*
* Default value: 1000 satoshis.
*
* [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
* [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
*/
public void set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(long val) {
bindings.ChannelConfig_set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound
* HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users.
*
* Usage:
* - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids]
* generated by this channel's counterparty.
* - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call
* [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in
* [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and
* actual forward amounts is their fee.
*
* # Note
* It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is
* as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money!
* [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the
* counterparty.
*
* # Note
* Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
* Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
*
* Default value: false.
*
* [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
* [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
* [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
* [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
* [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat
* [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat
*/
public boolean get_accept_underpaying_htlcs() {
boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound
* HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users.
*
* Usage:
* - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids]
* generated by this channel's counterparty.
* - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call
* [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in
* [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and
* actual forward amounts is their fee.
*
* # Note
* It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is
* as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money!
* [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the
* counterparty.
*
* # Note
* Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
* Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
*
* Default value: false.
*
* [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
* [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
* [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
* [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
* [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat
* [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat
*/
public void set_accept_underpaying_htlcs(boolean val) {
bindings.ChannelConfig_set_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* Constructs a new ChannelConfig given each field
*/
public static ChannelConfig of(int forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, int forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg, long force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg, boolean accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg.ptr, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg, accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(cltv_expiry_delta_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
long clone_ptr() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_clone_ptr(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* Creates a copy of the ChannelConfig
*/
public ChannelConfig clone() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_clone(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Checks if two ChannelConfigs contain equal inner contents.
* This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields.
* Two objects with NULL inner values will be considered "equal" here.
*/
public boolean eq(org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig b) {
boolean ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_eq(this.ptr, b == null ? 0 : b.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(b);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(b); };
return ret;
}
@Override public boolean equals(Object o) {
if (!(o instanceof ChannelConfig)) return false;
return this.eq((ChannelConfig)o);
}
/**
* Applies the given [`ChannelConfigUpdate`] as a partial update to the [`ChannelConfig`].
*/
public void apply(org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfigUpdate update) {
bindings.ChannelConfig_apply(this.ptr, update == null ? 0 : update.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(update);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(update); };
}
/**
* Creates a "default" ChannelConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
*/
public static ChannelConfig with_default() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_default();
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Serialize the ChannelConfig object into a byte array which can be read by ChannelConfig_read
*/
public byte[] write() {
byte[] ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_write(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* Read a ChannelConfig from a byte array, created by ChannelConfig_write
*/
public static Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ read(byte[] ser) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_read(ser);
Reference.reachabilityFence(ser);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
}