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package org.ldk.structs;
import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
import org.ldk.enums.*;
import org.ldk.util.*;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.lang.ref.Reference;
import javax.annotation.Nullable;
/**
* Configuration we set when applicable.
*
* Default::default() provides sane defaults.
*/
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
public class ChannelHandshakeConfig extends CommonBase {
ChannelHandshakeConfig(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); }
@Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
super.finalize();
if (ptr != 0) { bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_free(ptr); }
}
/**
* Confirmations we will wait for before considering the channel locked in.
* Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
* equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
*
* A lower-bound of 1 is applied, requiring all channels to have a confirmed commitment
* transaction before operation. If you wish to accept channels with zero confirmations, see
* [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and
* [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`].
*
* Default value: 6.
*
* [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
* [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf
*/
public int get_minimum_depth() {
int ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_minimum_depth(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* Confirmations we will wait for before considering the channel locked in.
* Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
* equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
*
* A lower-bound of 1 is applied, requiring all channels to have a confirmed commitment
* transaction before operation. If you wish to accept channels with zero confirmations, see
* [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and
* [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`].
*
* Default value: 6.
*
* [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
* [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf
*/
public void set_minimum_depth(int val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_minimum_depth(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
* the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
* transaction).
*
* This is one of the main parameters of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
* be online to check for revoked transactions on-chain at least once every our_to_self_delay
* blocks (minus some margin to allow us enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction,
* possibly with time in between to RBF the spending transaction).
*
* Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
* case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
* our channel.
*
* Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`], we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you
* can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
*/
public short get_our_to_self_delay() {
short ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_to_self_delay(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* Set to the number of blocks we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money (ie
* the number of blocks we have to punish our counterparty if they broadcast a revoked
* transaction).
*
* This is one of the main parameters of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
* be online to check for revoked transactions on-chain at least once every our_to_self_delay
* blocks (minus some margin to allow us enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction,
* possibly with time in between to RBF the spending transaction).
*
* Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
* case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
* our channel.
*
* Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`], we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you
* can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
*/
public void set_our_to_self_delay(short val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_to_self_delay(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* Set to the smallest value HTLC we will accept to process.
*
* This value is sent to our counterparty on channel-open and we close the channel any time
* our counterparty misbehaves by sending us an HTLC with a value smaller than this.
*
* Default value: 1. If the value is less than 1, it is ignored and set to 1, as is required
* by the protocol.
*/
public long get_our_htlc_minimum_msat() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* Set to the smallest value HTLC we will accept to process.
*
* This value is sent to our counterparty on channel-open and we close the channel any time
* our counterparty misbehaves by sending us an HTLC with a value smaller than this.
*
* Default value: 1. If the value is less than 1, it is ignored and set to 1, as is required
* by the protocol.
*/
public void set_our_htlc_minimum_msat(long val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_htlc_minimum_msat(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* Sets the percentage of the channel value we will cap the total value of outstanding inbound
* HTLCs to.
*
* This can be set to a value between 1-100, where the value corresponds to the percent of the
* channel value in whole percentages.
*
* Note that:
* If configured to another value than the default value 10, any new channels created with
* the non default value will cause versions of LDK prior to 0.0.104 to refuse to read the
* `ChannelManager`.
*
* This caps the total value for inbound HTLCs in-flight only, and there's currently
* no way to configure the cap for the total value of outbound HTLCs in-flight.
*
* The requirements for your node being online to ensure the safety of HTLC-encumbered funds
* are different from the non-HTLC-encumbered funds. This makes this an important knob to
* restrict exposure to loss due to being offline for too long.
* See [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] and [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
* for more information.
*
* Default value: 10.
* Minimum value: 1, any values less than 1 will be treated as 1 instead.
* Maximum value: 100, any values larger than 100 will be treated as 100 instead.
*/
public byte get_max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel() {
byte ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* Sets the percentage of the channel value we will cap the total value of outstanding inbound
* HTLCs to.
*
* This can be set to a value between 1-100, where the value corresponds to the percent of the
* channel value in whole percentages.
*
* Note that:
* If configured to another value than the default value 10, any new channels created with
* the non default value will cause versions of LDK prior to 0.0.104 to refuse to read the
* `ChannelManager`.
*
* This caps the total value for inbound HTLCs in-flight only, and there's currently
* no way to configure the cap for the total value of outbound HTLCs in-flight.
*
* The requirements for your node being online to ensure the safety of HTLC-encumbered funds
* are different from the non-HTLC-encumbered funds. This makes this an important knob to
* restrict exposure to loss due to being offline for too long.
* See [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] and [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
* for more information.
*
* Default value: 10.
* Minimum value: 1, any values less than 1 will be treated as 1 instead.
* Maximum value: 100, any values larger than 100 will be treated as 100 instead.
*/
public void set_max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel(byte val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
* BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
* our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
* relay HTLCs to us using the channel's SCID alias.
*
* If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
* prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
* [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
*
* Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
* counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
* private channel without that option.
*
* Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
* [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
* [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
*
* Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
*
* [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
* [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
*/
public boolean get_negotiate_scid_privacy() {
boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_negotiate_scid_privacy(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
* BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
* our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
* relay HTLCs to us using the channel's SCID alias.
*
* If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
* prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
* [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
*
* Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
* counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
* private channel without that option.
*
* Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
* [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
* [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
*
* Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
*
* [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
* [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
*/
public void set_negotiate_scid_privacy(boolean val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_negotiate_scid_privacy(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
* channel.
*
* This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
*
* As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
* channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
*
* Default value: false.
*/
public boolean get_announced_channel() {
boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_announced_channel(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
* channel.
*
* This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
*
* As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
* channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
*
* Default value: false.
*/
public void set_announced_channel(boolean val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_announced_channel(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
* supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
* at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
*
* This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
* any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
* lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
*
* The upfront key committed is provided from [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`].
*
* Default value: true.
*
* [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]: crate::sign::SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey
*/
public boolean get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey() {
boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
* supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
* at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
*
* This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
* any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
* lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
*
* The upfront key committed is provided from [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`].
*
* Default value: true.
*
* [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]: crate::sign::SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey
*/
public void set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(boolean val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* The Proportion of the channel value to configure as counterparty's channel reserve,
* i.e., `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` for both outbound and inbound channels.
*
* `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` is the minimum balance that the other node has to maintain
* on their side, at all times.
* This ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
* claiming at least this value on chain.
*
* Channel reserve values greater than 30% could be considered highly unreasonable, since that
* amount can never be used for payments.
* Also, if our selected channel reserve for counterparty and counterparty's selected
* channel reserve for us sum up to equal or greater than channel value, channel negotiations
* will fail.
*
* Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.104 will fail to read channels with any channel reserve
* other than the default value.
*
* Default value: 1% of channel value, i.e., configured as 10,000 millionths.
* Minimum value: If the calculated proportional value is less than 1000 sats, it will be treated
* as 1000 sats instead, which is a safe implementation-specific lower bound.
* Maximum value: 1,000,000, any values larger than 1 Million will be treated as 1 Million (or 100%)
* instead, although channel negotiations will fail in that case.
*/
public int get_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths() {
int ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* The Proportion of the channel value to configure as counterparty's channel reserve,
* i.e., `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` for both outbound and inbound channels.
*
* `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` is the minimum balance that the other node has to maintain
* on their side, at all times.
* This ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
* claiming at least this value on chain.
*
* Channel reserve values greater than 30% could be considered highly unreasonable, since that
* amount can never be used for payments.
* Also, if our selected channel reserve for counterparty and counterparty's selected
* channel reserve for us sum up to equal or greater than channel value, channel negotiations
* will fail.
*
* Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.104 will fail to read channels with any channel reserve
* other than the default value.
*
* Default value: 1% of channel value, i.e., configured as 10,000 millionths.
* Minimum value: If the calculated proportional value is less than 1000 sats, it will be treated
* as 1000 sats instead, which is a safe implementation-specific lower bound.
* Maximum value: 1,000,000, any values larger than 1 Million will be treated as 1 Million (or 100%)
* instead, although channel negotiations will fail in that case.
*/
public void set_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths(int val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* If set, we attempt to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`option for all future
* channels. This feature requires having a reserve of onchain funds readily available to bump
* transactions in the event of a channel force close to avoid the possibility of losing funds.
*
* Note that if you wish accept inbound channels with anchor outputs, you must enable
* [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and manually accept them with
* [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]. This is done to give you the chance to check
* whether your reserve of onchain funds is enough to cover the fees for all existing and new
* channels featuring anchor outputs in the event of a force close.
*
* If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
* prior to 0.0.116, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
* [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
*
* Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
* counterparties that do not support the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option; we will simply
* fall back to a `static_remote_key` channel.
*
* LDK will not support the legacy `option_anchors` commitment version due to a discovered
* vulnerability after its deployment. For more context, see the [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee
* Considered Harmful`] mailing list post.
*
* Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
*
* [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
* [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
* [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
* [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee Considered Harmful`]: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-September/002796.html
*/
public boolean get_negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
boolean ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* If set, we attempt to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`option for all future
* channels. This feature requires having a reserve of onchain funds readily available to bump
* transactions in the event of a channel force close to avoid the possibility of losing funds.
*
* Note that if you wish accept inbound channels with anchor outputs, you must enable
* [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and manually accept them with
* [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]. This is done to give you the chance to check
* whether your reserve of onchain funds is enough to cover the fees for all existing and new
* channels featuring anchor outputs in the event of a force close.
*
* If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
* prior to 0.0.116, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
* [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
*
* Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
* counterparties that do not support the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option; we will simply
* fall back to a `static_remote_key` channel.
*
* LDK will not support the legacy `option_anchors` commitment version due to a discovered
* vulnerability after its deployment. For more context, see the [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee
* Considered Harmful`] mailing list post.
*
* Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
*
* [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
* [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
* [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
* [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee Considered Harmful`]: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-September/002796.html
*/
public void set_negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(boolean val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* The maximum number of HTLCs in-flight from our counterparty towards us at the same time.
*
* Increasing the value can help improve liquidity and stability in
* routing at the cost of higher long term disk / DB usage.
*
* Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.115 will fail to read channels with a configuration
* other than the default value.
*
* Default value: 50
* Maximum value: 483, any values larger will be treated as 483.
* This is the BOLT #2 spec limit on `max_accepted_htlcs`.
*/
public short get_our_max_accepted_htlcs() {
short ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_max_accepted_htlcs(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* The maximum number of HTLCs in-flight from our counterparty towards us at the same time.
*
* Increasing the value can help improve liquidity and stability in
* routing at the cost of higher long term disk / DB usage.
*
* Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.115 will fail to read channels with a configuration
* other than the default value.
*
* Default value: 50
* Maximum value: 483, any values larger will be treated as 483.
* This is the BOLT #2 spec limit on `max_accepted_htlcs`.
*/
public void set_our_max_accepted_htlcs(short val) {
bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_max_accepted_htlcs(this.ptr, val);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(val);
}
/**
* Constructs a new ChannelHandshakeConfig given each field
*/
public static ChannelHandshakeConfig of(int minimum_depth_arg, short our_to_self_delay_arg, long our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, byte max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg, boolean negotiate_scid_privacy_arg, boolean announced_channel_arg, boolean commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg, int their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths_arg, boolean negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_arg, short our_max_accepted_htlcs_arg) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(minimum_depth_arg, our_to_self_delay_arg, our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg, max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg, negotiate_scid_privacy_arg, announced_channel_arg, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg, their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths_arg, negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_arg, our_max_accepted_htlcs_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(minimum_depth_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(our_to_self_delay_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(negotiate_scid_privacy_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(announced_channel_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_arg);
Reference.reachabilityFence(our_max_accepted_htlcs_arg);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
long clone_ptr() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_clone_ptr(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
return ret;
}
/**
* Creates a copy of the ChannelHandshakeConfig
*/
public ChannelHandshakeConfig clone() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_clone(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Creates a "default" ChannelHandshakeConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
*/
public static ChannelHandshakeConfig with_default() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelHandshakeConfig_default();
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelHandshakeConfig(null, ret); }
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
}