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package org.ldk.structs;
import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
import org.ldk.enums.*;
import org.ldk.util.*;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.lang.ref.Reference;
import javax.annotation.Nullable;
/**
* Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
* channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
*
* Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
* to individual Channels.
*
* Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
* all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
* serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
* called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
*
* Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
* [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
* [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
* [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
* `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
* `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
* deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
* [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
* will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
*
* Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
* tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
* See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
*
* Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
* [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
* spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
* offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
* [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
*
* To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
* inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
* not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
* many peers with unfunded channels.
*
* Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
* exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
* never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
*
* Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
* a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
* essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
* [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
* you're using lightning-net-tokio.
*
* [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
* [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
* [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
* [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
* [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
* [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
* [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
* [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
*/
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
public class ChannelManager extends CommonBase {
ChannelManager(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); }
@Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
super.finalize();
if (ptr != 0) { bindings.ChannelManager_free(ptr); }
}
/**
* Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
*
* The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
*
* This is the main \"logic hub\" for all channel-related actions, and implements
* [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
*
* Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
*
* Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
* disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
* from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
* more details.
*
* [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
* [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
* [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
*/
public static ChannelManager of(org.ldk.structs.FeeEstimator fee_est, org.ldk.structs.Watch chain_monitor, org.ldk.structs.BroadcasterInterface tx_broadcaster, org.ldk.structs.Router router, org.ldk.structs.Logger logger, org.ldk.structs.EntropySource entropy_source, org.ldk.structs.NodeSigner node_signer, org.ldk.structs.SignerProvider signer_provider, org.ldk.structs.UserConfig config, org.ldk.structs.ChainParameters params, int current_timestamp) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_new(fee_est.ptr, chain_monitor.ptr, tx_broadcaster.ptr, router.ptr, logger.ptr, entropy_source.ptr, node_signer.ptr, signer_provider.ptr, config == null ? 0 : config.ptr, params == null ? 0 : params.ptr, current_timestamp);
Reference.reachabilityFence(fee_est);
Reference.reachabilityFence(chain_monitor);
Reference.reachabilityFence(tx_broadcaster);
Reference.reachabilityFence(router);
Reference.reachabilityFence(logger);
Reference.reachabilityFence(entropy_source);
Reference.reachabilityFence(node_signer);
Reference.reachabilityFence(signer_provider);
Reference.reachabilityFence(config);
Reference.reachabilityFence(params);
Reference.reachabilityFence(current_timestamp);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelManager(null, ret); }
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(ret_hu_conv); };
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(fee_est); };
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(chain_monitor); };
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(tx_broadcaster); };
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(router); };
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(logger); };
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(entropy_source); };
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(node_signer); };
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(signer_provider); };
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(config); };
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(params); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
*/
public UserConfig get_current_default_configuration() {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_get_current_default_configuration(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
org.ldk.structs.UserConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UserConfig(null, ret); }
if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
*
* `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
* [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
* correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
* randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
* is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
*
* Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
* greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
*
* Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
* generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
* [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
*
* Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
* connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
* the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
*
* Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
* [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
* [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
* [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
* one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
* immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
*
* [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
* [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
* [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
*
* Note that override_config (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
*/
public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ create_channel(byte[] their_network_key, long channel_value_satoshis, long push_msat, org.ldk.util.UInt128 user_channel_id, @Nullable org.ldk.structs.UserConfig override_config) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_create_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(their_network_key, 33), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id.getLEBytes(), override_config == null ? 0 : override_config.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(their_network_key);
Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_value_satoshis);
Reference.reachabilityFence(push_msat);
Reference.reachabilityFence(user_channel_id);
Reference.reachabilityFence(override_config);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(override_config); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
* more information.
*/
public ChannelDetails[] list_channels() {
long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_channels(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
if (ret_conv_16_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
}
return ret_conv_16_arr;
}
/**
* Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
* [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
*
* These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
* documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
* are.
*/
public ChannelDetails[] list_usable_channels() {
long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_usable_channels(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
if (ret_conv_16_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
}
return ret_conv_16_arr;
}
/**
* Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
*/
public ChannelDetails[] list_channels_with_counterparty(byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_channels_with_counterparty(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
int ret_conv_16_len = ret.length;
ChannelDetails[] ret_conv_16_arr = new ChannelDetails[ret_conv_16_len];
for (int q = 0; q < ret_conv_16_len; q++) {
long ret_conv_16 = ret[q];
org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails ret_conv_16_hu_conv = null; if (ret_conv_16 < 0 || ret_conv_16 > 4096) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelDetails(null, ret_conv_16); }
if (ret_conv_16_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_16_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
ret_conv_16_arr[q] = ret_conv_16_hu_conv;
}
return ret_conv_16_arr;
}
/**
* Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
* successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
*
* This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
* result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
* [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
*
* [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
*/
public RecentPaymentDetails[] list_recent_payments() {
long[] ret = bindings.ChannelManager_list_recent_payments(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
int ret_conv_22_len = ret.length;
RecentPaymentDetails[] ret_conv_22_arr = new RecentPaymentDetails[ret_conv_22_len];
for (int w = 0; w < ret_conv_22_len; w++) {
long ret_conv_22 = ret[w];
org.ldk.structs.RecentPaymentDetails ret_conv_22_hu_conv = org.ldk.structs.RecentPaymentDetails.constr_from_ptr(ret_conv_22);
if (ret_conv_22_hu_conv != null) { ret_conv_22_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
ret_conv_22_arr[w] = ret_conv_22_hu_conv;
}
return ret_conv_22_arr;
}
/**
* Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
* will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
* pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
*
* If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
* [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
* fee estimate.
* If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
* transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
* would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
* counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
*
* May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
*
* Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
* generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
* [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
* channel.
*
* [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
* [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
* [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
* [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
*/
public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
* will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
* pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
*
* `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
* the channel being closed or not:
* If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
* transaction. The upper-bound is set by
* [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
* fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
* If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
* transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
* will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
*
* The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
* Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
* ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
* also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
*
* May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
*
* Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
* generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
* [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
* channel.
*
* [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
* [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
* [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
*
* Note that shutdown_script (or a relevant inner pointer) may be NULL or all-0s to represent None
*/
public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id, org.ldk.structs.Option_u32Z target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, @Nullable org.ldk.structs.ShutdownScript shutdown_script) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33), target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight.ptr, shutdown_script == null ? 0 : shutdown_script.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
Reference.reachabilityFence(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight);
Reference.reachabilityFence(shutdown_script);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight); };
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(shutdown_script); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
* rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
* the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
* channel.
*/
public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
* the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
* `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
*
* You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
* [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
*/
public Result_NoneAPIErrorZ force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(byte[] channel_id, byte[] counterparty_node_id) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(channel_id, 32), InternalUtils.check_arr_len(counterparty_node_id, 33));
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_id);
Reference.reachabilityFence(counterparty_node_id);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_NoneAPIErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneAPIErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
* for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
*/
public void force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn() {
bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
}
/**
* Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
* local transaction(s).
*/
public void force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn() {
bindings.ChannelManager_force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(this.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
}
/**
* Sends a payment along a given route.
*
* Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
* fields for more info.
*
* May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
* [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
*
* # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
*
* If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
* method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
* is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
* [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
* second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
*
* Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
* tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
* should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
* consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
* [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
*
* Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
* before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
* using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
* [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
*
* # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
*
* Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
* each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
* [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
*
* In general, a path may raise:
* [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
* node public key) is specified.
* [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
* closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
* [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
* relevant updates.
*
* Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
* irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
* different route unless you intend to pay twice!
*
* [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
* [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
* [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
* [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
* [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
* [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
*/
public Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ send_payment_with_route(org.ldk.structs.Route route, byte[] payment_hash, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment_with_route(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
Reference.reachabilityFence(recipient_onion);
Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NonePaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route); };
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(recipient_onion); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
* `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
*/
public Result_NoneRetryableSendFailureZ send_payment(byte[] payment_hash, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id, org.ldk.structs.RouteParameters route_params, org.ldk.structs.Retry retry_strategy) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_payment(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_hash, 32), recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32), route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr, retry_strategy.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_hash);
Reference.reachabilityFence(recipient_onion);
Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
Reference.reachabilityFence(route_params);
Reference.reachabilityFence(retry_strategy);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_NoneRetryableSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneRetryableSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(recipient_onion); };
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route_params); };
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(retry_strategy); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
* pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
* retries are exhausted.
*
* # Event Generation
*
* If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
* as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
*
* Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
* wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
* determine the ultimate status of a payment.
*
* # Requested Invoices
*
* In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
* the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
* and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
* once the invoice has been received.
*
* # Restart Behavior
*
* If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
* [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
* [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
*
* [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
*/
public void abandon_payment(byte[] payment_id) {
bindings.ChannelManager_abandon_payment(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
}
/**
* Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
* generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
* the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
* would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
* never reach the recipient.
*
* See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
* and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
*
* Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
* [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
*
* [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
*/
public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesPaymentSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment(org.ldk.structs.Route route, org.ldk.structs.Option_ThirtyTwoBytesZ payment_preimage, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment(this.ptr, route == null ? 0 : route.ptr, payment_preimage.ptr, recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32));
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(route);
Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
Reference.reachabilityFence(recipient_onion);
Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_ThirtyTwoBytesPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route); };
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(payment_preimage); };
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(recipient_onion); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
* based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
*
* See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
* payments.
*
* [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
*/
public Result_ThirtyTwoBytesRetryableSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(org.ldk.structs.Option_ThirtyTwoBytesZ payment_preimage, org.ldk.structs.RecipientOnionFields recipient_onion, byte[] payment_id, org.ldk.structs.RouteParameters route_params, org.ldk.structs.Retry retry_strategy) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(this.ptr, payment_preimage.ptr, recipient_onion == null ? 0 : recipient_onion.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(payment_id, 32), route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr, retry_strategy.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_preimage);
Reference.reachabilityFence(recipient_onion);
Reference.reachabilityFence(payment_id);
Reference.reachabilityFence(route_params);
Reference.reachabilityFence(retry_strategy);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_ThirtyTwoBytesRetryableSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ThirtyTwoBytesRetryableSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(payment_preimage); };
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(recipient_onion); };
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route_params); };
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(retry_strategy); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
* [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
* us to easily discern them from real payments.
*/
public Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZPaymentSendFailureZ send_probe(org.ldk.structs.Path path) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_probe(this.ptr, path == null ? 0 : path.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(path);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZPaymentSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZPaymentSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(path); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
* amount to the given `node_id`.
*
* See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
*/
public Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(byte[] node_id, long amount_msat, int final_cltv_expiry_delta, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z liquidity_limit_multiplier) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(node_id, 33), amount_msat, final_cltv_expiry_delta, liquidity_limit_multiplier.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(node_id);
Reference.reachabilityFence(amount_msat);
Reference.reachabilityFence(final_cltv_expiry_delta);
Reference.reachabilityFence(liquidity_limit_multiplier);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(liquidity_limit_multiplier); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
* according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
*
* This may be used to send \"pre-flight\" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
* the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
* probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
* confirmation in a wallet UI.
*
* Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
* actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
* liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
* payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
* amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
* probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
*/
public Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ send_preflight_probes(org.ldk.structs.RouteParameters route_params, org.ldk.structs.Option_u64Z liquidity_limit_multiplier) {
long ret = bindings.ChannelManager_send_preflight_probes(this.ptr, route_params == null ? 0 : route_params.ptr, liquidity_limit_multiplier.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(route_params);
Reference.reachabilityFence(liquidity_limit_multiplier);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ ret_hu_conv = Result_CVec_C2Tuple_ThirtyTwoBytesThirtyTwoBytesZZProbeSendFailureZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(route_params); };
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(liquidity_limit_multiplier); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
*
* Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
* or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
*
* Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
* across the p2p network.
*
* Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
* for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
*
* May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
* channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
* keys per-channel).
*
* Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
* counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
* [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
*
* Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
* not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
* create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
*
* Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
* the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
* implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See