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package org.ldk.structs;
import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
import org.ldk.enums.*;
import org.ldk.util.*;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.lang.ref.Reference;
import javax.annotation.Nullable;
/**
* A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in
* [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md).
*
* Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet and should implement signing
* policies in order to be secure. Please refer to the [VLS Policy
* Controls](https://gitlab.com/lightning-signer/validating-lightning-signer/-/blob/main/docs/policy-controls.md)
* for an example of such policies.
*/
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
public class EcdsaChannelSigner extends CommonBase {
final bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner bindings_instance;
EcdsaChannelSigner(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); bindings_instance = null; }
private EcdsaChannelSigner(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner arg, bindings.LDKChannelSigner ChannelSigner, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
super(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_new(arg, ChannelSigner, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.clone_ptr()));
this.ptrs_to.add(arg);
this.ptrs_to.add(ChannelSigner);
this.bindings_instance = arg;
}
@Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
if (ptr != 0) { bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_free(ptr); } super.finalize();
}
/**
* Destroys the object, freeing associated resources. After this call, any access
* to this object may result in a SEGFAULT or worse.
*
* You should generally NEVER call this method. You should let the garbage collector
* do this for you when it finalizes objects. However, it may be useful for types
* which represent locks and should be closed immediately to avoid holding locks
* until the GC runs.
*/
public void destroy() {
if (ptr != 0) { bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_free(ptr); }
ptr = 0;
}
public static interface EcdsaChannelSignerInterface {
/**
* Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
*
* Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
*
* Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
* sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
*
* The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
* A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
* preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
*
* Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
* irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
*/
Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages);
/**
* Validate the counterparty's revocation.
*
* This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
* forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
*/
Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret);
/**
* Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
*
* This will be called
* - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
* - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
*
* This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
*
* An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
*/
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
/**
* Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
* or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
*
* A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
* similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
* It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
* to an upcoming timelock expiration.
*
* Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
*
* `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
* revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
* not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
* so).
*/
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key);
/**
* Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
* HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
*
* A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
* similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
* It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
* to an upcoming timelock expiration.
*
* `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
* signature.
*
* `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
* revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
* not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
* so).
*
* `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
* (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
*/
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
/**
* Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
* `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
* must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`].
*
* Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a
* [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
* broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
*
* [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All
* [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
*/
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor);
/**
* Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
* transaction, either offered or received.
*
* Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
* preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
* signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
* needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
*
* `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
* outputs.
*
* `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
*
* `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
* detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
* channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
* BIP 143 signature.
*/
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
/**
* Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
*
* Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
* chosen to forgo their output as dust.
*/
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction closing_tx);
/**
* Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
* input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
*/
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input);
/**
* Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
* channel participants.
*
* Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
* signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
*
* Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
* our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
* protocol.
*/
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
}
private static class LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder { EcdsaChannelSigner held; }
public static EcdsaChannelSigner new_impl(EcdsaChannelSignerInterface arg, ChannelSigner.ChannelSignerInterface ChannelSigner_impl, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
final LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder impl_holder = new LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder();
impl_holder.held = new EcdsaChannelSigner(new bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner() {
@Override public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv, preimages);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_counterparty_revocation(idx, secret);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_holder_commitment(long commitment_tx) {
org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, long htlc) {
org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long htlc_descriptor) {
org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = null; if (htlc_descriptor < 0 || htlc_descriptor > 4096) { htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor(null, htlc_descriptor); }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, long htlc) {
org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_closing_transaction(long closing_tx) {
org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx_hu_conv = null; if (closing_tx < 0 || closing_tx > 4096) { closing_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction(null, closing_tx); }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx, input);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(long msg) {
org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg_hu_conv = null; if (msg < 0 || msg > 4096) { msg_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, msg); }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(msg_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
}, ChannelSigner.new_impl(ChannelSigner_impl, pubkeys).bindings_instance, pubkeys);
return impl_holder.held;
}
/**
* Gets the underlying ChannelSigner.
*/
public ChannelSigner get_channel_signer() {
ChannelSigner res = new ChannelSigner(null, bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_get_ChannelSigner(this.ptr));
res.ptrs_to.add(this);
return res;
}
/**
* Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
*
* Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
*
* Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
* sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
*
* The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
* A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
* preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
*
* Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
* irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
*/
public Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(preimages).map(preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
Reference.reachabilityFence(preimages);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Validate the counterparty's revocation.
*
* This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
* forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
*/
public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_validate_counterparty_revocation(this.ptr, idx, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(secret, 32));
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(idx);
Reference.reachabilityFence(secret);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
*
* This will be called
* - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
* - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
*
* This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
*
* An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
* or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
*
* A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
* similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
* It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
* to an upcoming timelock expiration.
*
* Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
*
* `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
* revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
* not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
* so).
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32));
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
* HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
*
* A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
* similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
* It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
* to an upcoming timelock expiration.
*
* `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
* signature.
*
* `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
* revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
* not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
* so).
*
* `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
* (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
* `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
* must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`].
*
* Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a
* [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
* broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
*
* [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType::All
* [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor == null ? 0 : htlc_descriptor.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_descriptor);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc_descriptor); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
* transaction, either offered or received.
*
* Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
* preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
* signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
* needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
*
* `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
* outputs.
*
* `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
*
* `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
* detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
* channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
* BIP 143 signature.
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point);
Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
*
* Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
* chosen to forgo their output as dust.
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx == null ? 0 : closing_tx.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(closing_tx);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(closing_tx); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
* input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, anchor_tx, input);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(anchor_tx);
Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
* channel participants.
*
* Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
* signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
*
* Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
* our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
* protocol.
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(msg); };
return ret_hu_conv;
}
}