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Neo4j kernel is a lightweight, embedded Java database designed to
store data structured as graphs rather than tables. For more
information, see http://neo4j.org.
/*
* Copyright (c) "Neo4j"
* Neo4j Sweden AB [https://neo4j.com]
*
* This file is part of Neo4j.
*
* Neo4j is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see .
*/
package org.neo4j.kernel.impl.security;
import static java.net.HttpURLConnection.HTTP_NOT_MODIFIED;
import inet.ipaddr.IPAddressString;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.net.CookieHandler;
import java.net.CookieManager;
import java.net.CookiePolicy;
import java.net.HttpURLConnection;
import java.net.Inet6Address;
import java.net.InetAddress;
import java.net.MalformedURLException;
import java.net.URISyntaxException;
import java.net.URL;
import java.net.URLConnection;
import java.net.UnknownHostException;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.zip.GZIPInputStream;
import java.util.zip.InflaterInputStream;
import org.neo4j.configuration.GraphDatabaseInternalSettings;
import org.neo4j.csv.reader.CharReadable;
import org.neo4j.csv.reader.Readables;
import org.neo4j.exceptions.LoadExternalResourceException;
import org.neo4j.graphdb.config.Configuration;
import org.neo4j.graphdb.security.URLAccessValidationError;
import org.neo4j.internal.kernel.api.security.SecurityAuthorizationHandler;
import org.neo4j.internal.kernel.api.security.SecurityContext;
public class WebURLAccessRule implements AccessRule {
public static final String LOAD_CSV_USER_AGENT_PREFIX = "NeoLoadCSV_";
private static final int REDIRECT_LIMIT = 10;
private final Configuration config;
public static final int CONNECTION_TIMEOUT = 2000;
public static final int READ_TIMOUT = 10 * 60 * 1000;
private static final CookieManager cookieManager;
static {
cookieManager = new CookieManager();
CookieHandler.setDefault(cookieManager);
cookieManager.setCookiePolicy(CookiePolicy.ACCEPT_ALL);
}
public WebURLAccessRule(Configuration config) {
this.config = config;
}
public static String userAgent() {
var version = Runtime.version();
var agent = System.getProperty("http.agent");
if (agent == null) {
return "Java/" + version;
}
return agent + " Java/" + version;
}
URL checkNotBlockedAndPinToIP(
URL url, SecurityAuthorizationHandler securityAuthorizationHandler, SecurityContext securityContext)
throws UnknownHostException, MalformedURLException, URISyntaxException, URLAccessValidationError {
// Keep doing this for community, and for backward compatibility with users (and tests) that don't
// have security enabled.
List blockedIpRanges = config.get(GraphDatabaseInternalSettings.cypher_ip_blocklist);
InetAddress inetAddress = InetAddress.getByName(url.getHost());
for (var blockedIpRange : blockedIpRanges) {
if (blockedIpRange.contains(new IPAddressString(inetAddress.getHostAddress()))) {
throw new URLAccessValidationError(
"access to " + inetAddress + " is blocked via the configuration property "
+ GraphDatabaseInternalSettings.cypher_ip_blocklist.name());
}
}
// RBAC security check
securityAuthorizationHandler.assertLoadAllowed(securityContext, url.toURI(), inetAddress);
// If the address is a http or ftp one, we want to avoid an extra DNS lookup to avoid
// DNS spoofing. It is unlikely, but it could happen between the first DNS resolve above
// and the con.connect() below, in case we have the JVM dns cache disabled, or it
// expires in between this two calls. Thus, we substitute the resolved ip here
//
// In the case of https DNS spoofing is not possible. Source here:
// https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/94331/why-doesnt-dns-spoofing-work-against-https-sites
URL result = url;
if (url.getProtocol().equals("http") || url.getProtocol().equals("ftp")) {
String ipAddress = inetAddress instanceof Inet6Address
? "[" + inetAddress.getHostAddress() + "]"
: inetAddress.getHostAddress();
result = substituteHostByIP(url, ipAddress);
}
return result;
}
protected URL substituteHostByIP(URL u, String ip) throws MalformedURLException {
String s;
int port;
String newURLString = u.getProtocol() + "://"
+ ((s = u.getUserInfo()) != null && !s.isEmpty() ? s + '@' : "")
+ ((s = u.getHost()) != null && !s.isEmpty() ? ip : "")
+ ((port = u.getPort()) != u.getDefaultPort() && port > 0 ? ':' + Integer.toString(port) : "")
+ ((s = u.getPath()) != null ? s : "")
+ ((s = u.getQuery()) != null ? '?' + s : "")
+ ((s = u.getRef()) != null ? '#' + s : "");
return new URL(newURLString);
}
private URLConnection checkUrlIncludingHops(
URL url, SecurityAuthorizationHandler securityAuthorizationHandler, SecurityContext securityContext)
throws IOException, URISyntaxException, URLAccessValidationError {
URL result = url;
boolean keepFollowingRedirects;
int redirectLimit = REDIRECT_LIMIT;
URLConnection urlCon;
HttpURLConnection httpCon;
do {
// We need to validate each intermediate url if there are redirects.
// Otherwise, we could have situations like an internal ip, e.g. 10.0.0.1
// is banned in the config, but it redirects to another different internal ip
// and we would still have a security hole
result = checkNotBlockedAndPinToIP(result, securityAuthorizationHandler, securityContext);
urlCon = result.openConnection();
if (urlCon instanceof HttpURLConnection) {
httpCon = (HttpURLConnection) urlCon;
httpCon.setRequestProperty(
"User-Agent", String.format("%s%s", LOAD_CSV_USER_AGENT_PREFIX, userAgent()));
httpCon.setInstanceFollowRedirects(false);
httpCon.connect();
httpCon.getInputStream();
keepFollowingRedirects = isRedirect(httpCon.getResponseCode());
if (keepFollowingRedirects) {
if (redirectLimit-- == 0) {
httpCon.disconnect();
throw new URLAccessValidationError("Redirect limit exceeded");
}
String location = httpCon.getHeaderField("Location");
if (location == null) {
httpCon.disconnect();
throw new IOException("URL responded with a redirect but the location header was null");
}
URL newUrl;
try {
newUrl = new URL(location);
if (!newUrl.getProtocol().equalsIgnoreCase(result.getProtocol())) {
return httpCon;
}
} catch (MalformedURLException e) {
// Try to use the location as a relative path, matches browser behaviour
newUrl = new URL(httpCon.getURL(), location);
}
result = newUrl;
}
} else {
keepFollowingRedirects = false;
}
} while (keepFollowingRedirects);
return urlCon;
}
private static boolean isRedirect(int responseCode) {
return responseCode >= 300 && responseCode <= 307 && responseCode != 306 && responseCode != HTTP_NOT_MODIFIED;
}
public URLConnection validate(
URL url, SecurityAuthorizationHandler securityAuthorizationHandler, SecurityContext securityContext)
throws URLAccessValidationError, IOException {
String host = url.getHost();
if (host != null && !host.isEmpty()) {
try {
return checkUrlIncludingHops(url, securityAuthorizationHandler, securityContext);
} catch (URISyntaxException e) {
throw new URLAccessValidationError("Unable to verify access to " + host + ". Cause: " + e.getMessage());
}
} else {
throw new URLAccessValidationError("Unable to verify access to URL" + url + ". URL is missing a host.");
}
}
@Override
public CharReadable getReader(
URL url, SecurityAuthorizationHandler securityAuthorizationHandler, SecurityContext securityContext)
throws URLAccessValidationError {
try {
InputStream stream = openStream(url, securityAuthorizationHandler, securityContext);
return Readables.wrap(
stream, url.toString(), StandardCharsets.UTF_8, 0); /*length doesn't matter in this context*/
} catch (IOException | URISyntaxException e) {
throw new LoadExternalResourceException(
String.format("Couldn't load the external resource at: %s", url), e);
}
}
private InputStream openStream(
URL url, SecurityAuthorizationHandler securityAuthorizationHandler, SecurityContext securityContext)
throws IOException, URISyntaxException, URLAccessValidationError {
URLConnection con = validate(url, securityAuthorizationHandler, securityContext);
if (con instanceof HttpURLConnection
&& WebURLAccessRule.isRedirect(((HttpURLConnection) con).getResponseCode())) {
/*
* Note, HttpURLConnection will stop following a redirect if protocol changes or if Location header is missing
* (in the current implementation of my java version).
* WebURLAccessRule.checkUrlIncludingHops will currently also stop if protocol changes,
* but throws an exception if Location is missing.
* The http spec recommends to always have a Location header for redirects, but do not strictly forbid it.
*
* To be consistent with checkUrlIncludingHops we throw an exception here if we end up at a redirect
* that can't be followed.
* This is in line with the recommendations of the spec.
* If it turns out there is some wretched http server out there that we need to support,
* that don't respect the spec recommendations, please don't forget to align checkUrlIncludingHops.
*/
throw new LoadExternalResourceException(String.format(
"LOAD CSV failed to access resource. The request to %s was at some point redirected to from which it could not proceed. This may happen if %s redirects to a resource which uses a different protocol than the original request.",
con.getURL(), con.getURL()));
}
con.setConnectTimeout(CONNECTION_TIMEOUT);
con.setReadTimeout(READ_TIMOUT);
var stream = con.getInputStream();
if ("gzip".equals(con.getContentEncoding())) {
return new GZIPInputStream(stream);
} else if ("deflate".equals(con.getContentEncoding())) {
return new InflaterInputStream(stream);
} else {
return stream;
}
}
}