org.openeuler.sun.security.ssl.RenegoInfoExtension Maven / Gradle / Ivy
/*
* Copyright (c) 2015, 2018, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER.
*
* This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as
* published by the Free Software Foundation. Oracle designates this
* particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided
* by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code.
*
* This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
* version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that
* accompanied this code).
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version
* 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation,
* Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
*
* Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA
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package org.openeuler.sun.security.ssl;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.nio.ByteBuffer;
import java.text.MessageFormat;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.Locale;
import javax.net.ssl.SSLProtocolException;
import org.openeuler.sun.security.ssl.ClientHello.ClientHelloMessage;
import static org.openeuler.sun.security.ssl.SSLExtension.CH_RENEGOTIATION_INFO;
import org.openeuler.sun.security.ssl.SSLExtension.ExtensionConsumer;
import static org.openeuler.sun.security.ssl.SSLExtension.SH_RENEGOTIATION_INFO;
import org.openeuler.sun.security.ssl.SSLExtension.SSLExtensionSpec;
import org.openeuler.sun.security.ssl.SSLHandshake.HandshakeMessage;
/**
* Pack of the "renegotiation_info" extensions [RFC 5746].
*/
final class RenegoInfoExtension {
static final HandshakeProducer chNetworkProducer =
new CHRenegotiationInfoProducer();
static final ExtensionConsumer chOnLoadConsumer =
new CHRenegotiationInfoConsumer();
static final HandshakeAbsence chOnLoadAbsence =
new CHRenegotiationInfoAbsence();
static final HandshakeProducer shNetworkProducer =
new SHRenegotiationInfoProducer();
static final ExtensionConsumer shOnLoadConsumer =
new SHRenegotiationInfoConsumer();
static final HandshakeAbsence shOnLoadAbsence =
new SHRenegotiationInfoAbsence();
static final SSLStringizer rniStringizer =
new RenegotiationInfoStringizer();
/**
* The "renegotiation_info" extension.
*/
static final class RenegotiationInfoSpec implements SSLExtensionSpec {
// A nominal object that does not holding any real renegotiation info.
static final RenegotiationInfoSpec NOMINAL =
new RenegotiationInfoSpec(new byte[0]);
private final byte[] renegotiatedConnection;
private RenegotiationInfoSpec(byte[] renegotiatedConnection) {
this.renegotiatedConnection = Arrays.copyOf(
renegotiatedConnection, renegotiatedConnection.length);
}
private RenegotiationInfoSpec(ByteBuffer m) throws IOException {
// Parse the extension.
if (!m.hasRemaining() || m.remaining() < 1) {
throw new SSLProtocolException(
"Invalid renegotiation_info extension data: " +
"insufficient data");
}
this.renegotiatedConnection = Record.getBytes8(m);
}
@Override
public String toString() {
MessageFormat messageFormat = new MessageFormat(
"\"renegotiated connection\": '['{0}']'", Locale.ENGLISH);
if (renegotiatedConnection.length == 0) {
Object[] messageFields = {
""
};
return messageFormat.format(messageFields);
} else {
Object[] messageFields = {
Utilities.toHexString(renegotiatedConnection)
};
return messageFormat.format(messageFields);
}
}
}
private static final
class RenegotiationInfoStringizer implements SSLStringizer {
@Override
public String toString(ByteBuffer buffer) {
try {
return (new RenegotiationInfoSpec(buffer)).toString();
} catch (IOException ioe) {
// For debug logging only, so please swallow exceptions.
return ioe.getMessage();
}
}
}
/**
* Network data producer of a "renegotiation_info" extension in
* the ClientHello handshake message.
*/
private static final
class CHRenegotiationInfoProducer implements HandshakeProducer {
// Prevent instantiation of this class.
private CHRenegotiationInfoProducer() {
// blank
}
@Override
public byte[] produce(ConnectionContext context,
HandshakeMessage message) throws IOException {
// The producing happens in client side only.
ClientHandshakeContext chc = (ClientHandshakeContext)context;
// Is it a supported and enabled extension?
if (!chc.sslConfig.isAvailable(CH_RENEGOTIATION_INFO)) {
if (SSLLogger.isOn && SSLLogger.isOn("ssl,handshake")) {
SSLLogger.fine(
"Ignore unavailable renegotiation_info extension");
}
return null;
}
if (!chc.conContext.isNegotiated) {
if (chc.activeCipherSuites.contains(
CipherSuite.TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV)) {
// Using the the TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV instead.
return null;
}
// initial handshaking.
//
// If this is the initial handshake for a connection, then the
// "renegotiated_connection" field is of zero length in both
// the ClientHello and the ServerHello. [RFC 5746]
byte[] extData = new byte[] { 0x00 };
chc.handshakeExtensions.put(
CH_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, RenegotiationInfoSpec.NOMINAL);
return extData;
} else if (chc.conContext.secureRenegotiation) {
// secure renegotiation
//
// For ClientHello handshake message in renegotiation, this
// field contains the "client_verify_data".
byte[] extData =
new byte[chc.conContext.clientVerifyData.length + 1];
ByteBuffer m = ByteBuffer.wrap(extData);
Record.putBytes8(m, chc.conContext.clientVerifyData);
// The conContext.clientVerifyData will be used for further
// processing, so it does not matter to save whatever in the
// RenegotiationInfoSpec object.
chc.handshakeExtensions.put(
CH_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, RenegotiationInfoSpec.NOMINAL);
return extData;
} else { // not secure renegotiation
if (HandshakeContext.allowUnsafeRenegotiation) {
if (SSLLogger.isOn && SSLLogger.isOn("ssl,handshake")) {
SSLLogger.warning("Using insecure renegotiation");
}
return null;
} else {
// terminate the session.
throw chc.conContext.fatal(Alert.HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
"insecure renegotiation is not allowed");
}
}
}
}
/**
* Network data producer of a "renegotiation_info" extension in
* the ServerHello handshake message.
*/
private static final
class CHRenegotiationInfoConsumer implements ExtensionConsumer {
// Prevent instantiation of this class.
private CHRenegotiationInfoConsumer() {
// blank
}
@Override
public void consume(ConnectionContext context,
HandshakeMessage message, ByteBuffer buffer) throws IOException {
// The consuming happens in server side only.
ServerHandshakeContext shc = (ServerHandshakeContext)context;
// Is it a supported and enabled extension?
if (!shc.sslConfig.isAvailable(CH_RENEGOTIATION_INFO)) {
if (SSLLogger.isOn && SSLLogger.isOn("ssl,handshake")) {
SSLLogger.fine("Ignore unavailable extension: " +
CH_RENEGOTIATION_INFO.name);
}
return; // ignore the extension
}
// Parse the extension.
RenegotiationInfoSpec spec;
try {
spec = new RenegotiationInfoSpec(buffer);
} catch (IOException ioe) {
throw shc.conContext.fatal(Alert.UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ioe);
}
if (!shc.conContext.isNegotiated) {
// initial handshaking.
if (spec.renegotiatedConnection.length != 0) {
throw shc.conContext.fatal(Alert.UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
"Invalid renegotiation_info extension data: not empty");
}
shc.conContext.secureRenegotiation = true;
} else {
if (!shc.conContext.secureRenegotiation) {
// Unexpected RI extension for insecure renegotiation,
// abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert.
throw shc.conContext.fatal(Alert.HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
"The renegotiation_info is present in a insecure " +
"renegotiation");
} else {
// verify the client_verify_data value
if (!Arrays.equals(shc.conContext.clientVerifyData,
spec.renegotiatedConnection)) {
throw shc.conContext.fatal(Alert.UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
"Invalid renegotiation_info extension data: " +
"incorrect verify data in ClientHello");
}
}
}
// Update the context.
//
// The conContext.clientVerifyData will be used for further
// processing, so it does not matter to save whatever in the
// RenegotiationInfoSpec object.
shc.handshakeExtensions.put(
CH_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, RenegotiationInfoSpec.NOMINAL);
// No impact on session resumption.
}
}
/**
* The absence processing if a "renegotiation_info" extension is
* not present in the ClientHello handshake message.
*/
private static final
class CHRenegotiationInfoAbsence implements HandshakeAbsence {
@Override
public void absent(ConnectionContext context,
HandshakeMessage message) throws IOException {
// The producing happens in server side only.
ServerHandshakeContext shc = (ServerHandshakeContext)context;
ClientHelloMessage clientHello = (ClientHelloMessage)message;
if (!shc.conContext.isNegotiated) {
// initial handshaking.
for (int id : clientHello.cipherSuiteIds) {
if (id ==
CipherSuite.TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV.id) {
if (SSLLogger.isOn && SSLLogger.isOn("ssl,handshake")) {
SSLLogger.finest(
"Safe renegotiation, using the SCSV signgling");
}
shc.conContext.secureRenegotiation = true;
return;
}
}
if (!HandshakeContext.allowLegacyHelloMessages) {
throw shc.conContext.fatal(Alert.HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
"Failed to negotiate the use of secure renegotiation");
} // otherwise, allow legacy hello message
if (SSLLogger.isOn && SSLLogger.isOn("ssl,handshake")) {
SSLLogger.warning("Warning: No renegotiation " +
"indication in ClientHello, allow legacy ClientHello");
}
shc.conContext.secureRenegotiation = false;
} else if (shc.conContext.secureRenegotiation) {
// Require secure renegotiation, terminate the connection.
throw shc.conContext.fatal(Alert.HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
"Inconsistent secure renegotiation indication");
} else { // renegotiation, not secure
if (HandshakeContext.allowUnsafeRenegotiation) {
if (SSLLogger.isOn && SSLLogger.isOn("ssl,handshake")) {
SSLLogger.warning("Using insecure renegotiation");
}
} else {
// Unsafe renegotiation should have been aborted in
// ealier processes.
if (SSLLogger.isOn && SSLLogger.isOn("ssl,handshake")) {
SSLLogger.fine("Terminate insecure renegotiation");
}
throw shc.conContext.fatal(Alert.HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
"Unsafe renegotiation is not allowed");
}
}
}
}
/**
* Network data producer of a "renegotiation_info" extension in
* the ServerHello handshake message.
*/
private static final
class SHRenegotiationInfoProducer implements HandshakeProducer {
// Prevent instantiation of this class.
private SHRenegotiationInfoProducer() {
// blank
}
@Override
public byte[] produce(ConnectionContext context,
HandshakeMessage message) throws IOException {
// The producing happens in server side only.
ServerHandshakeContext shc = (ServerHandshakeContext)context;
// In response to "renegotiation_info" extension request only.
RenegotiationInfoSpec requestedSpec = (RenegotiationInfoSpec)
shc.handshakeExtensions.get(CH_RENEGOTIATION_INFO);
if (requestedSpec == null && !shc.conContext.secureRenegotiation) {
// Ignore, no renegotiation_info extension or SCSV signgling
// requested.
if (SSLLogger.isOn && SSLLogger.isOn("ssl,handshake")) {
SSLLogger.finest(
"Ignore unavailable renegotiation_info extension");
}
return null; // ignore the extension
}
if (!shc.conContext.secureRenegotiation) {
// Ignore, no secure renegotiation is negotiated.
if (SSLLogger.isOn && SSLLogger.isOn("ssl,handshake")) {
SSLLogger.finest(
"No secure renegotiation has been negotiated");
}
return null; // ignore the extension
}
if (!shc.conContext.isNegotiated) {
// initial handshaking.
//
// If this is the initial handshake for a connection, then the
// "renegotiated_connection" field is of zero length in both
// the ClientHello and the ServerHello. [RFC 5746]
byte[] extData = new byte[] { 0x00 };
// The conContext.client/serverVerifyData will be used for
// further processing, so it does not matter to save whatever
// in the RenegotiationInfoSpec object.
shc.handshakeExtensions.put(
SH_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, RenegotiationInfoSpec.NOMINAL);
return extData;
} else {
// secure renegotiation
//
// For secure renegotiation, the server MUST include a
// "renegotiation_info" extension containing the saved
// client_verify_data and server_verify_data in the ServerHello.
int infoLen = shc.conContext.clientVerifyData.length +
shc.conContext.serverVerifyData.length;
byte[] extData = new byte[infoLen + 1];
ByteBuffer m = ByteBuffer.wrap(extData);
Record.putInt8(m, infoLen);
m.put(shc.conContext.clientVerifyData);
m.put(shc.conContext.serverVerifyData);
// The conContext.client/serverVerifyData will be used for
// further processing, so it does not matter to save whatever
// in the RenegotiationInfoSpec object.
shc.handshakeExtensions.put(
SH_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, RenegotiationInfoSpec.NOMINAL);
return extData;
}
}
}
/**
* Network data consumer of a "renegotiation_info" extension in
* the ServerHello handshake message.
*/
private static final
class SHRenegotiationInfoConsumer implements ExtensionConsumer {
// Prevent instantiation of this class.
private SHRenegotiationInfoConsumer() {
// blank
}
@Override
public void consume(ConnectionContext context,
HandshakeMessage message, ByteBuffer buffer) throws IOException {
// The producing happens in client side only.
ClientHandshakeContext chc = (ClientHandshakeContext)context;
// In response to the client renegotiation_info extension request
// or SCSV signling, which is mandatory for ClientHello message.
RenegotiationInfoSpec requestedSpec = (RenegotiationInfoSpec)
chc.handshakeExtensions.get(CH_RENEGOTIATION_INFO);
if (requestedSpec == null &&
!chc.activeCipherSuites.contains(
CipherSuite.TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV)) {
throw chc.conContext.fatal(Alert.INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Missing renegotiation_info and SCSV detected in " +
"ClientHello");
}
// Parse the extension.
RenegotiationInfoSpec spec;
try {
spec = new RenegotiationInfoSpec(buffer);
} catch (IOException ioe) {
throw chc.conContext.fatal(Alert.UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ioe);
}
if (!chc.conContext.isNegotiated) { // initial handshake
// If the extension is present, set the secure_renegotiation
// flag to TRUE. The client MUST then verify that the
// length of the "renegotiated_connection" field is zero,
// and if it is not, MUST abort the handshake (by sending
// a fatal handshake_failure alert). [RFC 5746]
if (spec.renegotiatedConnection.length != 0) {
throw chc.conContext.fatal(Alert.HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
"Invalid renegotiation_info in ServerHello: " +
"not empty renegotiated_connection");
}
chc.conContext.secureRenegotiation = true;
} else { // renegotiation
// The client MUST then verify that the first half of the
// "renegotiated_connection" field is equal to the saved
// client_verify_data value, and the second half is equal to the
// saved server_verify_data value. If they are not, the client
// MUST abort the handshake. [RFC 5746]
int infoLen = chc.conContext.clientVerifyData.length +
chc.conContext.serverVerifyData.length;
if (spec.renegotiatedConnection.length != infoLen) {
throw chc.conContext.fatal(Alert.HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
"Invalid renegotiation_info in ServerHello: " +
"invalid renegotiated_connection length (" +
spec.renegotiatedConnection.length + ")");
}
byte[] cvd = chc.conContext.clientVerifyData;
if (!Utilities.equals(spec.renegotiatedConnection,
0, cvd.length, cvd, 0, cvd.length)) {
throw chc.conContext.fatal(Alert.HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
"Invalid renegotiation_info in ServerHello: " +
"unmatched client_verify_data value");
}
byte[] svd = chc.conContext.serverVerifyData;
if (!Utilities.equals(spec.renegotiatedConnection,
cvd.length, infoLen, svd, 0, svd.length)) {
throw chc.conContext.fatal(Alert.HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
"Invalid renegotiation_info in ServerHello: " +
"unmatched server_verify_data value");
}
}
// Update the context.
chc.handshakeExtensions.put(
SH_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, RenegotiationInfoSpec.NOMINAL);
// No impact on session resumption.
}
}
/**
* The absence processing if a "renegotiation_info" extension is
* not present in the ServerHello handshake message.
*/
private static final
class SHRenegotiationInfoAbsence implements HandshakeAbsence {
@Override
public void absent(ConnectionContext context,
HandshakeMessage message) throws IOException {
// The producing happens in client side only.
ClientHandshakeContext chc = (ClientHandshakeContext)context;
// In response to the client renegotiation_info extension request
// or SCSV signling, which is mandatory for ClientHello message.
RenegotiationInfoSpec requestedSpec = (RenegotiationInfoSpec)
chc.handshakeExtensions.get(CH_RENEGOTIATION_INFO);
if (requestedSpec == null &&
!chc.activeCipherSuites.contains(
CipherSuite.TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV)) {
throw chc.conContext.fatal(Alert.INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Missing renegotiation_info and SCSV detected in " +
"ClientHello");
}
if (!chc.conContext.isNegotiated) {
// initial handshaking.
if (!HandshakeContext.allowLegacyHelloMessages) {
throw chc.conContext.fatal(Alert.HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
"Failed to negotiate the use of secure renegotiation");
} // otherwise, allow legacy hello message
if (SSLLogger.isOn && SSLLogger.isOn("ssl,handshake")) {
SSLLogger.warning("Warning: No renegotiation " +
"indication in ServerHello, allow legacy ServerHello");
}
chc.conContext.secureRenegotiation = false;
} else if (chc.conContext.secureRenegotiation) {
// Require secure renegotiation, terminate the connection.
throw chc.conContext.fatal(Alert.HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
"Inconsistent secure renegotiation indication");
} else { // renegotiation, not secure
if (HandshakeContext.allowUnsafeRenegotiation) {
if (SSLLogger.isOn && SSLLogger.isOn("ssl,handshake")) {
SSLLogger.warning("Using insecure renegotiation");
}
} else {
// Unsafe renegotiation should have been aborted in
// ealier processes.
if (SSLLogger.isOn && SSLLogger.isOn("ssl,handshake")) {
SSLLogger.fine("Terminate insecure renegotiation");
}
throw chc.conContext.fatal(Alert.HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
"Unsafe renegotiation is not allowed");
}
}
}
}
}
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