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org.sonar.l10n.javascript.rules.javascript.S5148.html Maven / Gradle / Ivy
A newly opened window having access back to the originating window could allow basic phishing attacks (the window.opener
object is not
null
and thus window.opener.location
can be set to a malicious website by the opened page).
For instance, an attacker can put a link (say: "http://example.com/mylink") on a popular website that changes, when opened, the original page to
"http://example.com/fake_login". On "http://example.com/fake_login" there is a fake login page which could trick real users to enter their
credentials.
Ask Yourself Whether
- The application opens untrusted external URL.
There is a risk if you answered yes to this question.
Recommended Secure Coding Practices
Use noopener
to prevent untrusted pages from abusing window.opener
.
Note: In Chrome 88+, Firefox 79+ or Safari 12.1+ target=_blank
on anchors implies rel=noopener
which make the protection
enabled by default.
Sensitive Code Example
window.open("https://example.com/dangerous");
Compliant Solution
window.open("https://example.com/dangerous", "WindowName", "noopener");
See
- OWASP Top 10 2021 Category A5 - Security Misconfiguration
- Reverse Tabnabbing
- MITRE, CWE-1022 - Use of Web Link to Untrusted Target with window.opener Access
- OWASP Top 10 2017 Category A6 - Security
Misconfiguration
- https://mathiasbynens.github.io/rel-noopener/